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Abstract
This work evaluates whether or not the interest rate rules under
di¤erent exchange rate regimes lead to a REE that is both locally
determinate and stable under adaptive learning by private agents. I
nd that monetary interdependence among countries is crucial for the
determinacy and learning stability of the economy in the open econ-
omy case, even without the coordination of the policymakers. Under
oating exchange rate regime, both countries should follow aggres-
sive interest rate rules simultaneously, in order to obtain determinate
and learnable REE. Furthermore, the openness diminishes the regions
for the determinate and learnable rules relative to its closed economy
counterpart under the oating regime, while in other exchange rate
regime, the additional reaction towards the level or change of nominal
exchange rate will enlarge this region.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview and main results
The implementation of monetary policy rules, particularly interest rate feed-
back rules, has been extensively studied in many aspects within the forward-
looking New Keynesian models recently. The current standard methodology
for modelling expectations in these models is to assume rational expectations
(RE), where agents fully understand the structure of the economy. However,
the RE methodology implicitly makes some rather strong assumptions, since
expectations can be out of equilibrium due to exogenous events and therefore
might result in instability of the equilibrium.1 Therefore, adaptive learning
approaches, as a relaxation of the assumption of RE, have been introduced
into New Keynesian literature, by assuming private agents follow a learning
process to form expectations. It has been recognized that learning stabil-
ity (learnability) is a necessary additional criterion for evaluating alternative
monetary policy feedback rules, and in particular, only policy rules inducing
learnable rational expectations equilibrium (REE) could be advocated.
Most of these discussions on monetary policy rules under adaptive learn-
ing are based on the standard New Keynesian model within a closed economy
context. However, in practice, most monetary authorities have to face an
open economy environment. Therefore, it is natural and necessary to extend
these discussions into open economy models to study how the consideration
of open economy will a¤ect the design of monetary policy. Ever since the
work of Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), there has been a large body of literature
on New Open-economy Macroeconomics. They are normally fully optimizing
models with monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities in an open econ-
omy framework. Incorporating elements from both these New Open-economy
Macroeconomic literature and the standard New Keynesian literature, some
researchers extend the New Keynesian model to an open economy context,
such as Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) (CGG (2002) hereafter), Gali and
1See Bullard and Mitra (2002), and Evans and Honkapohja (2003a, 2006) for the dis-
cussions.
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Monacelli (2005), and Benigno and Benigno (2006b) (BB (2006b) hereafter).2
They follow Calvo (1983) to model nominal rigidities, which allows richer dy-
namic e¤ects of monetary policy and longer periods of uctuation around the
equilibrium than those with only one-period advanced price-setting rule in
early literature of New Open-economy Macroeconomics.3 This characteristic
makes it natural and reasonable to conduct dynamic analysis under adap-
tive learning within open economies, providing new insights for the design of
monetary policies.
Based on BB (2006b), this paper discusses the learning stability for mon-
etary policy rules in a two-country model, which is one of the extensions
of the New Keynesian model to open economies. In particular, a special
open-economy Phillips curve with the terms of trade is introduced. There-
fore, there is explicit interaction between countries in this open economy,
even without instrument rules reacting towards international variables. Fur-
thermore, the economy is not fully forward-looking, which is di¤erent from
the New Keynesian literature in closed economies, since the terms of trade
are state variables and depend on the past values. Adopting the methods
developed by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001), this paper analyzes the
determinacy and learnability within this two-country model for di¤erent in-
terest rate rules under three exchange rate regimes: (1) a oating exchange
rate regime, (2) a xed exchange rate regime, and (3) two cases of man-
aged exchange rate regimes. The current results show that the conditions
for equilibrium determinacy are always su¢ cient for stability under adaptive
learning under three regimes, which is in line with McCallum (2006). In
particular, it is proved that the conditions for determinacy and learnability
coincide under the oating regime and xed regime.4
Another important nding is that under the oating regime, the interest
2BB (2006b) is a revised version of their previous working paper "Monetary Policy
Rules and the Exchange Rate" 2001 and "Exchange Rate Determination under Interest
Rate Rules" 2004.
3Such as the Redux model in Obstfeld and Rogo¤(1995), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(1998), Engel (2002), Devereux and Engel (2000), Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (2000, 2002), Tille
(2001), and others.
4The numerical results suggest that the conditions for determinacy and learnability
also coincide under managed regimes.
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rate rules followed by two countries are required to be simultaneously aggres-
sive, in order to guarantee the REE determinate and learnable. The failure
to satisfy the determinacy and learnability conditions in one country can
result in the indeterminate and unstable REE under learning for the whole
economy. Monetary interdependence, therefore, across countries is crucial
for the dynamics of the economy in the open economy case, even without
the coordination of the policymakers, as Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), CGG
(2002), and BB (2006b) discussed under rational expectations. Moreover, it
is found that the openness diminishes the region for determinate and learn-
able interest rate rules relative to its closed economy counterpart under the
oating regime. However, additional reaction to the change or the level of
the nominal exchange rate in policy rules of one country will enlarge the
region for determinacy and learnability under the xed regime and managed
regimes relative to the oating regime. The change of the region is due to the
terms of trade e¤ects in open economy environments. This paper also intro-
duces a new methodology to simplify the analysis of high-dimension system
by partitioning its matrix form into several subsystems. This methodology
will be discussed in detail in Section 2.5.
1.2 Related literature
Adopting the methods developed by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001),
Bullard and Mitra (2002) have discussed learnability for four typical variants
of Taylors interest rate feedback rules based on the model by Woodford
(1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998, 1999). They found that the
Taylor principle is closely linked with learnability for all four specications of
the policy rules, and the determinacy conditions are su¢ cient for learnability
when policy rules react to current values or future forecasts of ination and
output deviations, while it does not hold for policy rules under the lagged
data specication. McCallum (2006) obtains the same results for a general
class of linear models considered by Evans and Honkapohja (2001). His
analysis shows that for this broad class of models, determinacy condition is
su¢ cient but not necessary for learnability if current information is available
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for individuals, while it is not su¢ cient if instead only lagged information can
be observed in the learning process. Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) review
the recent work on interest rate setting, and emphasize that the design of
monetary policy needs to take into account the possibility that the economy
may not always be in a REE, and therefore the learnability constraint is a
key criterion in designing a good policy rule.
The recent paper by Bullard and Schaling (2006) (BS (2006) hereafter)
also discusses the learnability in a two country New Keynesian framework,
based on a di¤erent model by CGG (2002) from this paper. The framework
of CGG (2002) is a straightforward extension of the standard New Keyne-
sian model to two countries, in which there is a natural separation between
countries, and the di¤erence from its closed economy counterpart comes only
from the parameters of the model and the natural rate of variables. Using
the model by CGG (2002), BS (2006) have studied the determinacy and
learnability for both instrument rules and targeting rules with or without
concerns of international economic conditions, which leads to their results
with some di¤erences from this paper. They show that monetary policy rule
in each country must satisfy the determinacy and learnability conditions in-
dependently if policymaker focuses only on domestic ination and output
gap. On the other hand, if policymakers consider international economic
variables in their policy rules, it will induce international feedback between
the two economies, and therefore determinacy and learnability conditions
will depend on joint policies and economies of two countries.
Llosa and Tuesta (2005) (LT (2005) hereafter) have discussed the learn-
ability for monetary policy rules in a small open economy case, based also on
the model of CGG (2002).5 Following Bullard and Mitra (2002), they discuss
the determinacy and learnability for three simple monetary policy rules, a
domestic ination (DI) targeting Taylor-type rule, a consumer price ination
(CPI) targeting Taylor-type rule, and a policy rule for the managed exchange
regime.6 They argue that conditions for determinacy and E-stability in the
5Di¤erently, they assume there is home bias in preferences.
6In the managed exchange regime, the policy rule reacts to CPI and output gap as well
as the nominal exchange rate.
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small open economy model are isomorphic to those in a closed economy case
when policymakers follow contemporaneous data rules. However, they warn
that policymakers should be more careful about forward looking rules, which
can easily induce indeterminacy and instability under learning.
I introduce the two-country model and the methodologies used in this
paper in section 2, analyze the determinacy and learnability under di¤erent
exchange rate regimes in section 3, 4, and 5, and then draw the conclusions
in the last section.
2 The model and methodologies
2.1 The baseline model
The baseline model is outlined as a fully optimizing two-country model
with monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities, based on work of BB
(2006b).7 This model incorporates elements from both the large body of New
Keynesian literature in a closed economy and the recent literature on New
Open Economy Macroeconomics.
This economy is made up of two countries, the home country (H) and
the foreign country (F ). The whole economy is populated by a continuum of
households on the interval of [0; 1], in which the households over the [0; n) live
in the home country and the households over (n; 1] live in the foreign country.
A representative agent is both a producer and a consumer, who produces a
single di¤erentiated product but consumes all the goods produced in both
countries. The markets are complete both domestically and internationally,
by assuming that agents can trade complete contingent one-period nominal
bonds denominated in the Home currency.
As in the literature on New Open Economy Macroeconomics, both mo-
nopolistic competition and nominal rigidities are introduced into the model.
The former assumption rationalizes the existence of price stickiness without
violating the producers constraints. The latter assumption is introduced
in a di¤erent way from the most in the literature of New Open Economy
7See Benigno and Benigno (2006b) for more details of the model.
6
Macroeconomics, by assuming a Calvo-style (1983) price-setting rule, which
says that each rm has a xed probability of 1  to set a new price in each
period.8 This probability is not related to how long it has been since the
price adjustment last time, and it is the same for all agents.
This paper considers only the case where the instrument of monetary
policy is the domestic short-run nominal interest rate. Accordingly, the ex-
change rate regimes are modelled by designing di¤erent interest rate rules
followed by the central banks in both countries. Finally, there are two kinds
of country-specic uctuations, the demand shocks
 
gH ; gF

and the supply
shocks
 
aH ; aF

.
In the following sections, I mainly present the log-linear approximation
form of the model.
2.1.1 AD block
In the aggregate demand block, it is assumed that each agent derives util-
ity from consuming an index of the consumption goods and the holding of
money, while derives disutility from producing the products. Therefore, a
representative consumer chooses the consumption allocation by maximizing
the expected discounted value of the utility ow
U jt = Et
1X
s=t
s t

U
 
Cjs

+ L

M js
P is
; i

  V  yjs; zis ;
subject to the relevant budget constraints, with
i =
(
H; if j 2 [0; n)
F; if j 2 (n; 1] ;
where the upper index j denotes the individual agent j; the lower index i
denotes the specic country i; U is an increasing concave function of con-
sumption index of agent j; L is an increasing concave function of real money
balances M
P
; y is a production function;  is the intertemporal discount factor
8For the simplicity, the degrees of rigidity 1    are assumed to be the same across
countries in this paper.
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in the consumption preference, with 0 <  < 1; and  and z are country-
specic shocks to the money demand and productivity respectively.
Cj, CjH , and C
j
F are dened as
Cj 
 
CjH
n  
CjF
1 n
nn (1  n)1 n ;
CjH 
"
1
n
1= Z n
0
ci (h)
 1
 dh
#=(1 )
;
CjF 
"
1
1  n
1= Z 1
n
ci (f)
 1
 df
#=(1 )
;
where CjH and C
j
F are indexes of consumption across the continuum of dif-
ferentiated goods produced respectively in the home country and the foreign
country;  > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across di¤erentiated goods
produced within a country; and in this economy the elasticity of substitution
between the CH and CF is assumed as one. For simplicity, the parameter n
is assumed to denote not only the population size but also the share of the
bundle of goods produced within that country in the consumption index, i.e.
the economic size.
From the log-linear approximation to the rst-order conditions of the rep-
resentative consumers in the countries H and F, we can derive the equilibrium
conditions for the aggregate demand block. Due to the same of population
size and economic size, as well as the assumptions of complete international
markets and law of one price, the Euler equation can be described by only
one equation in the log-linear form9
EtC^t+1 = C^t + 
 1n
 
{^Ht   EtHt+1

+  1 (1  n)  {^Ft   EtFt+1 ; (1)
where C^ is the consumption index; {^Ht and {^
F
t are the nominal interest
rates in the home country and foreign country respectively; Ht and 
H
t are
the producer ination rates in the two countries respectively, with Ht =
9See Benigno and Benigno (2006b) and their Technical Appendix for the details of
derivation.
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lnPH;t=PH;t 1 and Ft = lnPF;t=PF;t 1; and  is the inverse of the intertem-
poral consumption elasticity of substitution. Therefore, the expected con-
sumption growth depends on the weighted average of real return in units of
the Home and Foreign goods indices.
The assumption of monopolistic competition implies that when prices are
xed the output is demand determined by
Y^ Ht = (1  n) T^t + C^t + gHt ; Y^ Ft =  nT^t + C^t + gFt ; (2)
where Y^ Ht and Y^
F
t are output produced in the home country and foreign
country respectively; and T^t is the terms of trade, which is the relative price of
imported goods to exported goods. Even though the aggregate consumption
index C^t has the same impacts on both countries, the terms of trade and the
country-specic demand shocks induce the dispersion of output across the
two countries.
In the following sections, I dene
XW  nXH + (1  n)XF ; XR  XF  XH ;
where ~X is the natural rate of X, and X^ is the sticky-price equilibrium of X,
given a variable XH for the home country and a variable XF for the foreign
country.
From (2), the world output can be written as the sum of world consump-
tion and world demand shock
Y^ Wt = C^t + g
W
t :
If dene the world output gap yW as the di¤erence between the sticky-price
equilibrium and exible-price equilibrium (the natural rate) of the world
output
yWt = Y^
W
t   ~Y Wt ;
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equation (1) can be written in terms of world output gap
yWt = Ety
W
t+1  1n
 
{^Ht   EtHt+1
  1 (1  n)  {^Ft   EtFt+1+ 1 ~RWt ; (3)
where ~RWt is the Wicksellian rate, which is the perturbation to the world
natural real interest rate and is a combination of world demand and supply
shocks.
Equation (3) is the microfounded "open-economy" IS curve for this model.
It is similar to the new IS curve in the New Keynesian model in a closed
economy. Actually, the IS curve for each country can be derived as
yHt = Ety
H
t+1    1n
 
{^Ht   EtHt+1
   1 (1  n)  {^Ft   EtFt+1 (3-1)
  (1  n)

EtT^t+1   T^t

+ rrHt ;
yFt = Ety
F
t+1    1n
 
{^Ht   EtHt+1
   1 (1  n)  {^Ft   EtFt+1 (3-2)
+n

EtT^t+1   T^t

+ rrFt ;
where yHt , y
F
t are the output gaps in the home country and foreign country
respectively; and rrHt and rr
F
t are functions of the natural rate of interest,
demand and supply shocks.
The log-linear approximation of the terms of trade denition is
T^t = T^t 1 +4St + Ft   Ht ; (4)
which implies the terms of trade are sluggish state variables, since they de-
pend on past values of the change of the nominal exchange rate and the
ination rate di¤erential. Furthermore, the di¤erent decomposition of the
adjustment of the terms of trade between the change of nominal exchange
rate and ination rate di¤erential can lead to di¤erent equilibria, depending
on the substitutability of goods produced within and across countries as well
as the monetary policies followed by both central banks.
From the uncovered interest parity, the expected depreciation of the ex-
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change rate depends on the nominal short-run interest rate di¤erential
Et4St+1 = {^Ht   {^Ft ; where 4St+1 = S^t+1   S^t: (5)
2.1.2 AS block
Under the Calvo-pricing assumption, each rm can set a new price with a
xed probability 1  in each period, by maximizing its expected discounted
value of prots.10 From the optimizing behaviour of rms, two aggregate
supply equations in the AS block are obtained11
Ht = cmcHt + EtHt+1; Ft = cmcFt + EtFt+1;
where cmc is the deviation of the real marginal costs from the steady state.
Together with the labour supply decisions of the households, the AS curves
for the two countries become
Ht = 
h
(1  n) (1 + )
bTt   eTt+ (+ )  yWt i+ EtHt+1 (6)
= (1  n) kT
bTt   eTt+ kCyWt + EtHt+1;
Ft = 
h
 n (1 + )
bTt   eTt+ (+ )  yWt i+ EtFt+1 (7)
=  nkT
bTt   eTt+ kCyWt + EtFt+1;
where dene kC   (+ ) and kT   (1 + ); eTt is the natural rate of the
terms of trade under exible prices, which is a combination of relative demand
and supply shocks; and  is the elasticity of the disutility of producing the
di¤erentiated goods.
Equations (6) and (7) are the dynamic forward-looking AS curves in an
open economy, in which the terms of trade have direct impacts on the real
marginal costs and thus inuence the domestic ination. Therefore, these
open-economy AS curves are di¤erent from the standard New Phillips curves
in the New Keynesian literature within the closed economy context, due to
10This model assumes complete pass-through for rms setting prices.
11Dene   [(1  ) (1  ) =]  [1= (1 + )] :
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the existence of additional channel of the terms of trade for the shock trans-
mission mechanism. For example, for the home country, an increase in the
terms of trade or a depreciation of the domestic currency results in an in-
crease in the relative price of the goods produced in the foreign country, i.e.
the domestically produced goods turn to be cheaper, which boosts the de-
mand for the goods produced in the home country and therefore pushes up
the domestic ination in the home country. Additionally, the rise in the do-
mestic production and the price of the imported goods cause the reduction in
the marginal utility of nominal income and the increase in the optimal prices
faced by the rms in the home country, which pushes up the domestic ina-
tion more. Therefore, in the open-economy Phillips curves, there is positive
inuence of the terms of trade on the domestic ination in the home country,
while there is negative inuence of the terms of trade on the ination in the
foreign country.
2.2 Interest rate rules under di¤erent monetary regimes
As in the standard New Keynesian literature, this model is closed by the
specication of the monetary policy rules followed by both central banks. The
short-term nominal interest rate is assumed as the instrument of monetary
policies. Normally, the interest rate rule in a closed economy is set to react
towards domestic ination and output gap, according to the classical Taylor
rule. In an open economy, however, the specication of the monetary rules
is much more controversial, due to more international variables to concern.12
I start by specifying the simple and reasonable interest rate rules to analyze
the determinacy and learnability in this two-country model.
Following the BB (2006b), three di¤erent exchange rate regimes will be
discussed: a oating exchange rate regime, a xed exchange rate regime
and the managed exchange rate regimes. Under di¤erent monetary regimes,
di¤erent interest rate rules are designed for the two countries, H and F,
respectively.
12For example, Ball (1998), Ghironi (1998), McCallum and Nelson (1998), Monacelli
(1998), Svensson (2000), and Weeparana (1998) have recently analyzed the monetary
policies in open-economy models.
12
1. Under a oating exchange rate regime, interest rate rules in both coun-
tries do not react directly to the nominal exchange rate
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ; (8)
{^Ft = 
Ft +  
yFt :
2. Under a xed exchange rate regime, the exchange rate of foreign cur-
rency is assumed to peg to the home currency. To get a determinate
and xed nominal exchange rate, the interest rate rules are designed
as13
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ; (9)
{^Ft = {^
H
t   S^t; where  > 0:
3. Under a managed exchange rate regime, it is assumed that the interest
rate rule in one country partly reacts to the nominal exchange rate,
either in level or in the deviations of the level.
Under managed exchange rate regime (I), the rule followed by the cen-
tral bank of the foreign country reacts to the level of the nominal ex-
change rate
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ; (10)
{^Ft = 
Ft +  
yFt   1S^t;
where S^t  ln (St=S) ; and S is the exchange rate target.
Under managed exchange rate regime (II), the rule followed by the
central bank of the foreign country reacts to the deviations in the level
of the nominal exchange rate from a dened target
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ; (11)
{^Ft = 
Ft +  
yFt   24St:
13There are many xed exchange rate regimes existent depending on the di¤erent spec-
ication of policy rules. Here is a simple one of them.
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For simplicity, this paper at rst considers the case that two countries
have the identical parameters in the policy rules, i.e.  = , and  =  , in
order to obtain analytical results. Afterwards, it discusses numerically the
interdependence across the two countries with di¤erent values of parameters
in the policy rules. All the parameters in the policy rules are non-negative,
i.e. ; ;  ;  ; ; 1; 2  0:
2.3 Summary of the structure
The structure of the model is characterized by the microfounded "open-
economy" IS curve (3), the open-economy AS curves (Phillips curves) (6)
and (7), the terms of trade equation (4), the uncovered interest parity (5),
and the interest rate rules (8), (9), (10), or (11) under di¤erent exchange rate
regimes
yWt = Ety
W
t+1  1n
 
{^Ht   EtHt+1
  1 (1  n)  {^Ft   EtFt+1+ 1 ~RWt ; (3)
yHt = Ety
H
t+1    1n
 
{^Ht   EtHt+1
   1 (1  n)  {^Ft   EtFt+1 (3-1)
  (1  n)

EtT^t+1   T^t

+ rrHt ;
yFt = Ety
F
t+1    1n
 
{^Ht   EtHt+1
   1 (1  n)  {^Ft   EtFt+1 (3-2)
+n

EtT^t+1   T^t

+ rrFt ;
Ht = (1  n) kT

T^t   ~Tt

+ kC
 
yWt

+ Et
H
t+1; (6)
Ft =  nkT

T^t   ~Tt

+ kC
 
yWt

+ Et
F
t+1; (7)
T^t = T^t 1 +4St + Ft   Ht ; (4)
Et4St+1 = {^Ht   {^Ft : (5)
It is obvious that the two countries are correlated in this economy, even
without reaction towards the international variables in policy rules. In par-
ticular, by introducing the terms of trade into the Phillips curve, the terms of
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trade and the nominal exchange rate have direct and implicit impacts on the
relative prices of goods and thus a¤ect the demand of the goods produced in
the di¤erent countries, which will in turn increase or decrease the producer
price ination. Furthermore, there is another channel where the exchange
rate and thus the international variables have impacts on the domestic econ-
omy if the policy rules responds directly towards the nominal exchange rate
in level or the deviations. Similarly, Guender (2006) introduces a model
with the existence of real exchange rate in the Phillips curve within a small
open economy. He discusses that the pricing decisions of domestic rms are,
therefore, a¤ected by movements of the exchange rate and other international
variables, and this feature will thus a¤ect the conduct of monetary policy in
open economy. CGG (2002) introduce another fully optimizing two-country
model with monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities. Di¤erently, the
model by CGG (2002) is a simple extension of the standard New Keynesian
model, with the same forms of the IS curves and Phillips curves as in its
the closed economy counterpart, and with the only di¤erence in parameters
and natural rate of interests. Therefore, the interaction of the two economies
in CGG (2002) comes only from the instrument rules with reaction towards
international variables followed by monetary authorities. If the instrument
rules only react towards domestic variables, the two countries are separated
naturally, and one country does not a¤ect the other directly or implicitly.
Furthermore, generally the model in this paper is not in a fully forward-
looking form as standard New Keynesian model, because the terms of trade
are state variables, which depend on past values of the change of the nom-
inal exchange rate and the ination rate di¤erential, as function (4) shows.
Therefore, the slow adjustment of prices in this two-country model not only
comes from the nominal rigidities but also comes from the inertia of the terms
of trade, which lead to the slow adjustment of the real marginal costs. One
exception is that the inertia of the terms of trade is completely eliminated
under the oating exchange rate regime.
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2.4 Flexible price equilibrium
The natural values of real variables are described by following
~CWt =

 + 
 
aWt   gWt

; ~Tt =

1 + 
 
gRt   aRt

;
~Y Ht = (1  n) ~Tt + ~CWt + gHt ; ~Y Ft =  n ~Tt + ~CWt + gFt :
From above, it is world shocks that have e¤ects on the natural rate of world
consumption, and relative shocks a¤ect the natural rate of the terms of trade.
In the equilibrium, the terms of trade equation (4) becomes
~Tt = ~Tt 1 +4 ~St + ~Ft   ~Ht :
By assuming zero producer ination rates in this particular exible price
equilibrium, it implies
~Tt = ~Tt 1 + ~St   ~St 1:
Given the initial values of ~T 1 = ~S 1 = 0, it means
~Tt = ~St:
From the uncovered interest parity equation (5), the natural nominal
interest rates di¤erential can be expressed as
~RRt  ~{Ht   ~{Ft = Et4 ~St+1 = Et

~Tt+1   ~Tt

: (12)
From the world average Euler equation (1), the world natural nominal interest
rate is determined by world shocks, where
~RWt  n~{Ht + (1  n)~{Ft = 

Et ~Ct+1   ~Ct

: (13)
The natural nominal interest rate for each country is therefore derived from
(12) and (13) as
~{Ht =
~RWt + (1 + n)
~RRt ; ~{
F
t =
~RWt   n ~RRt :
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2.5 Methodology
2.5.1 Equilibrium determinacy
The implementation of monetary policy rules, particularly interest rate feed-
back rules, has been extensively studied in many aspects within the New Key-
nesian literature recently. The rst major issue in the literature is whether
or not the designed monetary policy rule guarantees real determinacy. When
the system has unique stationary REE, the model is said to be determinate.
When there are multiple stationary solutions for REE, including "sunspot
solutions", the model su¤ers from indeterminacy, which is plainly undesir-
able.14 Bernanke andWoodford (1997), Svensson andWoodford (1999, 2003)
and Woodford (1999b, 2000) demonstrated that some policy rules can result
in indeterminacy of equilibrium or multiple RE solutions in a closed econ-
omy framework. Bullard and Mitra (2002), Evans and Honkapohja (2003a,
2003b, 2006) have further investigated this issue. Accordingly, this paper
rst discusses the equilibrium determinacy for the specic interest rate rules
under three di¤erent exchange rate regimes in this two-country model.
Consider a standard system of
yt = + Etyt+1 + yt 1 + !t; (14)
!t = '!t 1 + et; j'j < 1;
where yt is an n  1 vector of endogenous variables,  is an n  1 vector
of constants, ; ;  and ' are n  n matrices of coe¢ cients, !t is an n  1
vector of exogenous variables following a stationary VAR, and et is an n 1
vector of white noise terms.
To study determinacy, expectations can be replaced by their actual values
and the system can be written as
Yt+1 = JYt + other; (15)
14In the case of "sunspot solutions", REE depends on extraneous random variables that
inuence the economy solely through the expectations of the agents.
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where Yt 

Y1;t+1 Y2;t+1
0
, J 
 
J11 J12
J21 J22
!
, and Yi;t 

~yi;t y^i;t ~y
l
i;t
0
with i = 1; 2; ~yi;t denotes the endogenous variables in yi;t; y^i;t denotes the
predetermined variables in yi;t, including exogenous variables and lagged en-
dogenous variables; and other denotes the innovations arising from replacing
the expectations in the structural model by their actual values. The condi-
tion for equilibrium determinacy is therefore that the number of eigenvalues
of J outside the unit circle is equal to the dimension of endogenous variables
in Yt.
In some model, the system (15) can be expressed in the form of
Y1;t+1 = J11Y1;t + other1; (15-1)
Y2;t+1 = J21Y2;t + J22Y2;t + other2; (15-2)
in which the matrix J becomes lower block triangular, which is called as the
case (DE1). The eigenvalues of J are therefore all of the eigenvalues of J11
and J22. A necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy is therefore that
the number of all of the eigenvalues of J11 and J22 outside the unit circle is
equal to the dimension of endogenous variables in Yt.
Moreover, in order to get the determinate equilibrium for the full system
(15), the subsystem (15-1) should also be determinate, which means that the
number of eigenvalues of J11 outside the unit circle should be also exactly
equal to the dimension of endogenous variables in Y1;t. Therefore, the neces-
sary and su¢ cient condition for the determinacy of the full system (DE1) is
that each of the number of eigenvalues of J11 and J22 outside the unit circle
should be exactly equal to the dimension of endogenous variables in Y1;t and
Y2;t respectively.
Otherwise, if only the number of the eigenvalues of J (or J11 and J22)
outside the unit circle is equal to the dimension of endogenous variables ~yt, it
is possible for the full system (15) indeterminate in some cases. For example,
when the number of all the eigenvalues of J outside the unit circle happens
to be equal to the dimension of endogenous variables ~yt, but the number
of eigenvalues of J11 outside the unit circle is less than the dimension of
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endogenous variables in Y1;t, the subsystem (15-1) will be indeterminate,
which implies multiple stationary sunspot solutions for REE of Y1;t. For
each solution, the subsystem (15-2) has a corresponding stationary solution,
and therefore the full system (15) is indeterminate.
If J21 in (15-2) is null matrix, the matrix J in (15) becomes block diagonal,
which is called as the case (DE2). In this case, the system can be divided into
two independent subsystems. In order to get the determinate equilibrium for
the full system (15), the necessary and su¢ cient condition is that the two
systems must satisfy the condition for determinacy separately. That means
the number of eigenvalues of J11 and J22 outside the unit circle should be
respectively equal to the dimension of endogenous variables in Y1;t and Y2;t.
Therefore, if the system is in the form of (DE1), to obtain the determinacy
condition for full system (15) is equivalent to calculate the determinacy con-
dition for a simplied system (DE2) or two independent subsystems (15-3)
and (15-4).
Following this methodology, the analysis for large systems can be sim-
plied to derive the conditions for determinacy under three exchange rate
regimes.
2.5.2 Learning stability
By adopting the methods developed by Evans and Honkapohja (1999, 2001),
I analyze the learnability for the interest rate rules under di¤erent exchange
rate regimes in this two-country model. It is assumed that the expectations
of agents are not fully rational any more; instead, they use an adaptive
learning rule to form their expectation values and update their forecasting in
each period when new data becomes available. In particular, I will discuss the
recursive least squares (RLS) learning rules and conditions for expectational
stability (E-stability) for minimal state variable (MSV) solutions. As Evans
and Honkapohja (1998, 2001) showed, the RLS learning is convergent to REE
if and only if E-stability conditions are satised.15
15Marcet and Sargent (1989a, 1989b) discuss this issue for general linear models with a
unique REE. Evans and Honkapohja (1994, 1998) make an improvement mathematically
to discuss the local stability in univariate and multivariate linear models with multiple
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Following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), E-stability is dened considering
the standard model (14). The MSV solution is assumed in the form of
yt = a+ byt 1 + c!t; (16)
where a; b;and c are to be determined by the method of undetermined co-
e¢ cients. By assuming time-t information set (1; y0t; !
0
t), the corresponding
expectations are calculated as
Etyt+1 = a+ byt + c'!t:
Insert it into equation (14), and thus the MSV solution satises
(I   b  ) a = ; (17)
b2   b+  = 0; (18)
(I   b) c  c' = : (19)
Assume
 
a;b; c

is a particular MSV solution. To obtain the conditions
for E-stability, we regard equation (16) as the perceived law of motion (PLM),
and thus the actual law of motion (ALM) of yt can be derived as
yt = (I   b) 1 [+ a+ yt 1 + (+ c')!t] :
It implies the mapping from the PLM to the ALM
T (a; b; c) =
 
(I   b) 1 (+ a); (I   b) 1 ; (I   b) 1 (+ c') :
Therefore, the E-stability conditions can be stated in terms of following ma-
equilibria and global convergence in a model with a unique equilibrium.
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trices
DTa(a;b) =
 
I   b 1 ;
DTb(b) =
h 
I   b 1 i0 
 h I   b 1 i ; (20)
DTc(b; c) = '
0 

h 
I   b 1 i :
Evans and Honkapohja (2001) show that the condition for E-stability of
the MSV solution
 
a;b; c

is that all eigenvalues of the matrices DTa(a;b),
DTb(b), and DTc(b; c), given by equation (20), have real parts less than 1.
Otherwise, the solution is not E-stable.
Denote F   I   b 1  and 
   I   b 1 . A standard result
says that the eigenvalues of a Kronecker product are the products of the
eigenvalues of the relevant matrices.16 Since j'j < 1, the condition for E-
stability now becomes that all eigenvalues of the matrices F and 
 have real
parts less than 1.
We now consider partitioned systems for the E-stability analysis. Rewrite
the system (14) as 
y1;t
y2;t
!
=
 
P11 P12
P21 P22
! 
Ety1;t+1
Ety2;t+1
!
+
 
Q11 Q12
Q21 Q22
! 
y1;t 1
y2;t 1
!
+
 
K11 K12
K21 K22
! 
!1;t
!2;t
!
; (14)
where yt 

y01;t y
0
2;t
0
and !t 

!01;t !
0
2;t
0
.
If it happens that P12; Q12; and K12 are null matrices, the matrices P;
Q; K become lower block triangular, which is called as the case (ES1). The
system becomes
y1;t = P11Ety1;t+1 +Q11y1;t 1 +K11!1;t; (14-1)
y2;t = P21Ety1;t+1 + P22Ety2;t+1 +Q21y1;t 1 (14-2)
+Q22y2;t 1 +K21!1;t +K22!2;t;
16See Magnus and Neudecker (1998).
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where the rst subsystem (14-1) is independent from the second subsystem
(14-2).
It follows that the MSV solutions are in the form 
y1;t
y2;t
!
=
 
a11 a12
a21 a22
!
+
 
b11 0
b21 b22
! 
y1;t 1
y2;t 1
!
+
 
c11 0
c21 c22
! 
!1;t
!2;t
!
:
From (18), matrix b 
 
b11 0
b21 b22
!
satises
8><>:
P11b11b11   b11 +Q11 = 0;
P21b11b11 + P22b21b11 + P22b22b21   b21 +Q21 = 0;
P22b22b22   b22 +Q22 = 0:
(21)
b11, b22, b21 and thus b can be solved from equations (21). Therefore, it follows
F   I   Pb 1 P
=
  
I11   P11b11
 1
P11 0
WP11 +
 
I22   P22b22
 1
P21
 
I22   P22b22
 1
P22
!

 
F11 0
F21 F22
!
;
where we denote
W   I22   P22b22 1  P21b11 + P22b21  I11   P11b11 1
and

   I   Pb 1Q
=
  
I11   P11b11
 1
Q11 0
WQ11 +
 
I22   P22b22
 1
Q22
 
I22   P22b22
 1
Q22
!

 

11 0

21 
22
!
:
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Since matrices F and 
 are lower block triangular, the eigenvalues of F are
the eigenvalues of F11 and F22, and the eigenvalues of 
 are the eigenvalues of

11 and 
22. Therefore, to check the learnability of REE for the full system
is equivalent to check the eigenvalues of F11, F22, 
11 and 
22.
If P12, P21, Q12, Q21, K12 and K21are all null matrices, the matrices P; Q;
K become block diagonal, which is called as the case (ES2). The full system
(14) can be divided into two independent subsystems
y1;t = P11Ety1;t+1 +Q11y1;t 1 +K11!1;t; (14-1)
y2;t = P22Ety2;t+1 +Q22y2;t 1 +K22!2;t: (14-2)
It follows that the MSV solutions for the full system (14) are the same as the
MSV solutions for each subsystem, and they satisfy
y1;t = a11 + b11y1;t 1 + c11!1;t;
y2;t = a22 + b22y2;t 1 + c22!2;t:
Therefore, b can be solved from the rst and the third equation of the system
(21). In order to make REE of full system (14) learnable, each subsystem of
(14-1) and (14-2) should satisfy the condition for learnability. This require-
ment means that the eigenvalues of F11 and F22 in subsystem (14-1), and the
eigenvalues of 
11 and 
22 in subsystem (14-2) should have real parts less
than 1. This result is the same as the discussion for the case of system (ES1).
McCallum (2006) discusses the learnability for a general class of models,
based on a class of linear models considered by Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
which permits any number of lags, leads, and lags of leads. He proved that
if current information is available for individuals, determinacy conditions
are always su¢ cient but not necessary for E-stability and thus least square
learnability. However, it is not su¢ cient if instead only lagged information
can be observed in the learning process.17 This result will be used to obtain
the su¢ cient conditions of learnability for REE under managed regimes.
17See Evans and Honkapohja (2001) and McCallum (2006) for examples.
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2.6 The parameters
Analytical results have been obtained for most cases. However, the structure
of this model, with normally three or more dimensions, is much more com-
plicated than the case in a closed economy with normally two dimensions.
Therefore, this paper illustrates the ndings using a calibrated case. Accord-
ing to the discussion in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), the parameters
are calibrated by  = 0:47;  = 0:16; and  = 7:88, where  is the elastic-
ity of the disutility of producing the di¤erentiated goods,  is the inverse
of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, and  is the
elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a country. The value
of the intertemporal discount factor in the consumption preference  is set
throughout to 0:99, and the degrees of rigidity is set to vary in (0; 1). Policy
rules are calibrated for the parameters ,  , , 1 and 2, which appear in
the interest rate rules under di¤erent exchange rate regimes. The autocorre-
lations in the Wicksellian rate and natural terms of trade process are set to
be 0:4 in each case.
3 Floating exchange rate regime
3.1 The dynamic system
Under a oating exchange rate regime, both countries are assumed to follow
simple Taylor-type rules (8) with identical parameters. Therefore, equations
(3), (4), (5), (6), and (7), together with the interest rate rules (8), characterize
the log-linear equilibrium under the oating exchange rate regime.
From the Open-economy AS Curve (6), (7), the nominal ination rate
di¤erential is
Ft   Ht =  kT

T^t   ~Tt

+ Et
 
Ft+1   Ht+1

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and the world average ination rate can be derived as
nHt + (1  n)Ft =
 
nkCy
W
t + (1  n) kCyWt

+
 
nEt
H
t+1 + (1  n)EtFt+1

:
Substituting the interest rates with (8), the microfounded "open-economy"
IS curve (3) will be
yWt = Ety
W
t+1    1
 

 
nHt + (1  n)Ft

+  
 
yWt

+ 1
 
nEt
H
t+1 + (1  n)EtFt+1

+  1 ~RWt :
From the denition of the output gap and aggregate demand functions (2),
the output gap di¤erential is derived as
y^Ht   y^Ft = T^t   ~Tt: (22)
Therefore, the uncovered interest parity equation (5), combined with interest
rate rules (8) means that
Et4St+1 = 
 
Ht   Ft

+  
 
y^Ht   y^Ft

= 
 
Ht   Ft

+  

T^t   ~Tt

:
If denote Rt = 
F
t   Ht , and Wt = nHt + (1  n)Ft ; we can write the
full dynamic system as8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
Rt =  kT

T^t   ~Tt

+ Et
R
t+1;
T^t = T^t 1 +4St + Rt ;
Et4St+1 =  Rt +  

T^t   ~Tt

;
Wt = kCy
W
t + Et
W
t+1;
yWt = Ety
W
t+1    1
 
Wt +  
 
yWt

+  1EtWt+1 + 
 1 ~RWt :
If dene yFL1;t =

Rt T^t 4St
0
; yFL2;t =

Wt y
W
t
0
; !FL1;t =

~Tt; 0; 0
0
;
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and !FL2;t =

~RWt ; 0
0
, the system can be written as the matrix form of
 
yFL1;t
yFL2;t
!
=
 
P FL11 0
0 P FL22
! 
Ety
FL
1;t+1
Ety
FL
2;t+1
!
+
 
QFL11 0
0 0
! 
yFL1;t 1
yFL2;t 2
!
+
 
KFL11 0
0 KFL22
! 
!FL1;t
!FL2;t
!
; (23)
where
P FL11 =
0B@
 
 +kT
0  kT
 +kT

 +kT
0 1
 +kT
(  )
 +kT
0 (kT+1)
 +kT
1CA ; P FL22 =
 
1

  1

kC
 1

 

+ kC

+ 1
!
;
QFL11 =
0B@ 0 0 00 0 0
0  1 0
1CA ; KFL11 =
0B@ 0 0 01 0 0
1 0 0
1CA ; KFL22 =
 
kC
 ++kC
0
1
 ++kC
0
!
:
Under the oating exchange rate regime, even though there is no natural
separation between two countries, there is complete separation between world
variables and relative variables, which implies the full system can be divided
into two subsystems, one with world variables, and the other with relative
variables.
3.2 Determinacy
Even though the conditions for determinacy under three exchange rate regimes
have been discussed in BB (2006b), this paper will re-discuss the conditions
for determinacy with alternative proofs of mine.
The full system (23) under the oating regime can be written as two
independent systems
yFL1;t = P
FL
11 Ety
FL
1;t+1 +Q
FL
11 y
FL
1;t 1 +K
FL
11 !
FL
1;t ; (23-1)
yFL2;t = P
FL
22 Ety
FL
2;t+1 +K
FL
22 !
FL
2;t ; (23-2)
where the subsystem (23-2) is purely forward-looking.
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If denote Y FL1;t =

Rt 4St T^ lt
0
; Y FL2;t = y
FL
2;t =

Wt y
W
t
0
, where
T^ lt = T^t 1, the two subsystems (23-1) and (23-2) can be rewritten in the form
of the case (DE2), where
JFL11 =
0B@
kT+1

kT

kT

 +    
1 1 1
1CA ;
JFL22 =
 
P FL22
 1
:
In order to get the determinate equilibrium for the full system (23), the
two subsystems (23-3) and (23-4) should satisfy the condition for determinacy
separately. Because in subsystem (23-3) there is one predetermined variable
T^ lt and two endogenous variables 
R
t and 4St, the determinacy condition for
(23-3) is that exactly two of three eigenvalues of matrix JFL11 lie outside the
unit circle. Since there is no predetermined variable in subsystem (23-4), the
determinacy condition for (23-4) is that all of the two eigenvalues of matrix
JFL22 lie outside the unit circle. These imply following proposition under the
oating regime.
Proposition 1 Under a oating exchange regime dened by the rules of the
following form
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ;
{^Ft = 
F
t +  y
F
t ;
with  and  non negative, if the degrees of rigidity are equal across countries,
the necessary and su¢ cient condition for equilibrium determinacy is
kT (  1) +  (1  ) > 0; (FL1)
kC(  1) +  (1  ) > 0: (FL2)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
For simplicity, it has been assumed that the two countries have the same
degree of rigidities, and the parameters in policy rules are the same between
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two countries. The condition (FL2), which is required for the determinacy of
world average variables, is the same as that in the closed economy counter-
part, while the condition (FL1) required for the determinacy of country rela-
tive variables is generally di¤erent, depending on the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution in consumption  1. When  1 > 1, i.e. the intertempo-
ral consumption substitutability is larger than the substitutability of goods
across countries, we have kC < kT , and therefore the condition (FL1) implies
(FL2), which means the conditions for determinacy of REE is more strin-
gent than in the close economy counterpart. Otherwise, the conditions for
determinacy is the same as its closed economy counterpart, when  1  1.
If  = 0, the determinacy conditions will be simplied as  > 1, which is
well known as the Taylor Principle, and it suggests that the nominal interest
rates should be adjusted more than one-for-one with changes in ination.18
Finally, it should be noticed that both of the interest rate rules are required
to be simultaneously aggressive under the oating regime. Actually, the ag-
gressive policy rule followed by only one country could be no longer su¢ cient
for the determinacy of equilibrium without consideration of the monetary
policy rules followed by the other country. The further discussion of this
issue will be conducted in the next section.
3.3 Learning stability
Suppose ~Tt and ~RWt follow AR(1) processes as the following forms
~Tt = '1 ~Tt 1 + 
1
t ;
~RWt = '
W
2
~RWt 1 + 
2
t ;
where 0 < '1; '2 < 1, with 
1
t and 
2
t are iid stochastic processes. The
full system (23) can be divided into two independent subsystems (23-1) and
(23-2) as in the case (ES-2), with Q22 being null matrix.
18See Woodford (1999b, 2000).
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The MSV solutions for each subsystem can be respectively written as
yFL1;t = a
FL
1 + b
FL
1 y
FL
1;t 1 + c
FL
1
~Tt;
yFL2;t = a
FL
2 + c
FL
2
~RWt ;
which are also taken as the perceived laws of motion of representative agents.
Assume that the time-t information set for each agent is
 
1; yFL0i;t ; !
FL0
i;t

. The
assumptions on PLM and corresponding information set allow the foreign
variables are included in the perceived law of motion of a representative
agent, and therefore the agents can use information from both countries
under learning. Otherwise, if only domestic information is available, it would
be insu¢ cient for the agent to learn the REE, as BS (2006) discussed.19
Substitute the PLM into (23-1) and (23-2), and it follows that the MSV
solutions of subsystem (23-1) satisfy
(I   P FL11 bFL1   P FL11 )aFL1 = 0;
P FL11
 
bFL1
2   bFL1 +QFL11 = 0; (24)
(I   P FL11 bFL1 )cFL2   P FL11 cFL2 '1  KFL11 = 0;
and the MSV solutions of subsystem (23-2) satisfy
(I   P FL22 )aFL2 = 0; (25)
cFL2   P FL22 cFL2 '2  KFL22 = 0:
From (24) and (25), the REE is solved for the oating regime as
n
aFL1 ; b
FL
1 ; c
FL
1
o
and

aFL2 ; c
FL
2
	
.20
The corresponding E-stability conditions are that all the eigenvalues of
19The discussion on the perceived law of motion and information set in open economy
is controversial. Further investigation is in process.
20See Appendix II.
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DTa1, DTb1, DTc1 and DTa2, DTc2 have real parts less than 1, where
DTa =

I11   P FL11 b
FL
1
 1
P FL11 ;
DTb =

I11   P FL11 b
FL
1
 1
QFI11
0



I11   P FL11 b
FL
1
 1
P FL11

;
DTc =

I11   P FL11 b
FL
1
 1
P FL11 '1;
and
DTa2 = P
FL
22 ;
DTc2 = P
FL
22 '2:
This means that all the eigenvalues of F FL11 , 

FI
11 , and P
FL
22 have the real parts
less than 1, which implies the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under a oating exchange rate regime dened by the rules
of the following form
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ;
{^Ft = 
F
t +  y
F
t ;
with  and  non negative, if the degrees of rigidity are equal across countries,
the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the MSV solution of REE to be
stable under adaptive learning is
kT (  1) +  (1  ) > 0; (FL1)
kC(  1) +  (1  ) > 0: (FL2)
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The proposition 1 & 2 implies that the necessary and su¢ cient condi-
tions for learnability and determinacy coincide when Taylor-type rules are
followed by both countries under this oating regime. An important nd-
ing is that when  1 > 1, the condition (FL1) implies (FL2), and therefore
the conditions for the determinacy and learnability become more stringent
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in this two-country economy than in its close economy counterpart. Only
when  1  1, the condition (FL2) implies (FL1), and the conditions for de-
terminacy and learnability are the same as in its close economy counterpart.
Given the calibration in Section 2.6, the gure 1 plots the conditions for
determinacy and learnability as a function of  and  . The two lines are the
two conditions of determinacy and learnability. The upper line shows the
condition (FL1) with  = 0:16, and the lower line shows the condition (FL2).
The smaller value in , the larger intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption, more is the shift of the line (FL2) to northeast.
The Taylor principle,  > 1, is still su¢ cient to guarantee the deter-
minacy and learnability no matter what  is. Furthermore, for a positive
 , the region for  to satisfy the condition is allowed to be larger, which
means a trade-o¤ between policy parameters  and  , i.e. more weight on
the reaction towards the output gap in the policy rules, less reaction required
towards ination rate. Line (FL2) describes this trade-o¤ between  and  
for determinacy and learnability of world average variables; it is the same
condition as in its closed economy counterpart. However, when the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution in consumption  1 is larger than one, (recall
that  1 = 0:16 1 in my calibrated case), kT becomes larger than kC , and
line (FL1) is above line (FL2). The region for the determinate and learnable
interest rate rules is therefore diminished by the condition (FL1), and the
trade-o¤ between reactions towards output gap and ination in policy rules
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becomes worse.21 This requirement implies that the interest rate rules need
to be relatively more aggressive, when the central bank has open economy
consideration and meanwhile the substitutability across goods produced from
di¤erent countries are less than that of intertemporal consumption. As Fig-
ure 1 shows, the two countries have to choose their policy rule coe¢ cients
to the northeast of the upper line (FL1), in order to obtain determinacy
and learnability for the REE of whole economy. Only when  1  1, the
line (FL2) shifts above (FL1), and therefore the condition for determinacy
and learnability becomes (FL2), which is the same as in closed economy
case. This nding supports the result in BS (2006), when they discuss the
determinacy and learnability for the similar form of Taylor-type instrument
rules followed by both countries. They argue that the degree of openness has
quantitative e¤ects on the region for determinacy and learnability, and the
conditions for determinacy and learnability are more stringent with the open
economy considerations with the non-zero degree of openness.
Intuitively, the change of region for determinate and learnable interest
rate rules is due to the terms of trade e¤ects in open economy environ-
ments. Since the ination di¤erential will a¤ect the relative prices of goods
across countries, it will improve or worsen the domestic terms of trade, which
will shift the goods demand and a¤ect the ination rate and output gap.
For example, when a positive demand shock gHt or a negative supply shock
aHt hits the home economy, the natural rate of terms of trade increases as
~Tt =

1+
 
gRt   aRt

, which will push home ination rate going up. To reduce
the ination and o¤set the shock, the home central bank needs to increase
the interest rate following the policy rule (8). Without open economy con-
sideration, the policy parameters can be chosen by the home country on the
line (FL2), and it will reduce the home ination and output gap. However,
the decrease of the home ination will worsen the terms of trade or increase
T^t " as T^t = T^t 1 +4St + Ft   Ht , which implies a cheaper relative price
of home goods. The consumption of foreign households, therefore, switches
towards home goods, and push the home ination again. To fully o¤set the
21Empirically, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is normally
larger than one, for example in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), and Woodford (2003).
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shock and pull the ination back to the initial level, the home interest rate
need to be increased more, for example a policy on line (FL1), which means a
more aggressive policy rule for the home country. Only when  1  1, the in-
tertemporal elasticity in consumption is larger than substitutability of goods
across countries, the consideration of open economy for the home central
bank does not a¤ect its decision. Therefore, the inertia of the terms of trade
in open economy leads to slower adjustment of prices, and in turn weakens
the e¢ ciency of policy rules, compared with its closed economy counterpart.
Finally, the conditions for determinacy and learnability implicitly suggest
that both countries should follow aggressive instrument rules simultaneously.
Indeed, the failure to satisfy the determinacy and learnability conditions
in one country could result in indeterminacy and instability under learning
for the whole economy, due to the interdependence across countries. The
following section will discuss this issue more explicitly.
3.4 Interdependence across the two countries
The discussion in the above sections has suggested that both countries should
simultaneously follow aggressive instrument rules in order to guarantee the
determinacy and learnability of REE for whole economy. To see this more
explicitly, we relax the assumption of identical parameters in policy rules
followed by the two countries, and instead assumes that the home country
and foreign country follow the interest rate rules in the forms of
{^Ht = 
H
t ; (8*)
{^Ft = 
Ft ;
where the instrument rules only react towards ination rate with the same
or di¤erent values of parameters, with  =   = 0 .
If dene yFL;t =

yWt ; 
H
t ; 
F
t ;4St; T^t
0
, and !FL;t =

~RWt ;
~Tt; ~Tt; 0; 0
0
,
the dynamic system becomes
AFLy

FL;t = B

FLEty

FL;t+1 + F

FLy

FL;t 1 + C

FL!

FL;t;
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in which the matrices are given in Appendix A.5. It can be written as
yFL;t = P

FLEty

FL;t+1 +Q

FLy

FL;t 1 +K

FL!

FL;t; (23*)
where
P FL = A
 1
FL B

FL; Q

FL = A
 1
FL F

FL; K

FL = A
 1
FL C

FL:
Then follow the above procedure calibrating the economy, to test the deter-
minacy and learnability of REE for di¤erent value of parameters in policy
rules.
The only predetermined variable in system (23*) is T^t. If dene T^ lt  T^t 1;
and Y FL;t =

yWt 
H
t 
F
t 4St T^ lt

; the system can be written as
Y FL;t+1 = J
Y FL;t + other
; (DE*)
in which J is given in Appendix A.5. Therefore, the determinacy condition
is that four of all the eigenvalues of matrix J lie outside the unit circle, and
one of them lies inside the unit circle.
Varying the policy parameters  and , compute the eigenvalues of J to
see the determinacy of REE for di¤erent pairs of policy rules followed by the
two countries.
Suppose the MSV solutions for system (23*) can be written as
yFL;t = a

FL + b

FLy

FL;t 1 + c

FL!

FL;t;
which is also PLM of representative agents. Assuming the time-t information
set is
 
1; y
0
FL;t; !
0
FL;t

, substitute the PLM and its expectation into (23*)
to solve the REE faFL; bFL; cFLg. Then, we can compute the eigenvalues
of F 

I   P FLbFL
 1
P FL and 
 

I   P FLbFL
 1
QFI to test the
learnability of REE for di¤erent pairs of policy rules. In order to obtain the
learnable REE, all the eigenvalues need to have the real parts less than 1.
See Appendix A.4 for more details.
Varying the policy parameters  and , we can get the following table
to see the learnability of REE for di¤erent pairs of policy rules followed by
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the two countries.22
Table-FL1 Table-FL2
  Det
1:2 1:2 Y es
1:2 0:9 No
1:2 0:6 No
0:9 1:2 No
0:9 0:9 No
  ES
1:2 1:2 Y es
1:2 0:9 No
1:2 0:6 No
0:9 1:2 No
0:9 0:9 No
Det: Determinacy ES: E-stability
The Proposition 1 and 2 show that given  = 0, the nominal interest
rates should be adjusted more than one-for-one with changes in ination in
order to obtain the determinacy and learnability of the REE. It is well known
as the Taylor Principle. The above results in (Table-FL1) and (Table-FL2)
show that when the reaction towards ination in policy rules is large enough,
 =  = 1:2, the REE is both determinate and learnable. The necessary
and su¢ cient conditions for determinacy and learnability are therefore closely
linked to the Taylors Principle under this oating regime.
However, when the reaction towards ination in the policy rule followed by
one country is smaller than 1, the REE of the economy is neither determinate
nor learnable, no matter whether or not the other country follows a rule with
reaction towards ination larger than one. Therefore, the determinacy and
learnability of REE for the whole economy require that both countries should
follow aggressive interest rate rules simultaneously. This nding is consistent
with the result in BS (2006) that the determinacy and learnability conditions
must to be met country by country, and otherwise the world economy will
be indeterminate and unstable under learning.
22This paper does not discuss the learnability of sunspot equilibria.
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4 Fixed exchange rate regime
4.1 The dynamic system
There are many ways to specify the instrument rules that can implement a
xed exchange rate regime. BS (2006) introduces one way that one country
targets the nominal exchange rate and therefore its optimal interest rate
rule is a function of expectations of domestic variables and present values of
international variables. Here is another way to obtain a xed regime, where
the nominal interest rate in the foreign country is assumed to react to the
nominal interest rate in the home country and the deviations of the nominal
exchange rate from a desired target, while the interest rate in the home
country just follows a simple Taylor-type rule, as BB (2006b) discussed.
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ; (9)
{^Ft = {^
H
t   S^t;
where  > 0, S^t  ln (St=S), and S is the exchange rate target.
Equations (3), (3-1), (3-2), (4), (5), (6), and (7), together with the interest
rate rule (9), characterize the log-linear equilibrium under the xed regime.
Substituting interest rate rules (9) into the uncovered interest parity equa-
tion (5), it is obtained that
EtS^t+1 = (1 + ) S^t:
Therefore, the condition of  > 0 is su¢ cient to get a determinate and
bounded equilibrium for the nominal exchange rate, which implies the REE
of exchange rate satises St = S at all the time t, and bSt = 0, and therefore
{^Ft = {^
H
t .
Dene Rt  Ft   Ht , we can rewrite the full dynamic system (3), (3-1),
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(3-2), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (9) as8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
Rt =  kT

T^t   ~Tt

+ Et
R
t+1;
T^t = T^t 1 + Rt ;
Wt = kCy
W
t + Et
W
t+1;
Ht = (1  n) kT

T^t   ~Tt

+ kCy
W
t + Et
H
t+1;
yWt = Ety
W
t+1    1Ht    1 yHt +  1EtWt+1 +  1 ~RWt ;
yHt = Ety
H
t+1    1Ht    1 yHt +  1EtWt+1   (1  n)

EtT^t+1   T^t

+ rrHt :
If dene yFI1;t =

Rt T^t
0
, yFI2;t =

Wt 
H
t y
W
t y
H
t
0
, !FI1;t =

~Tt 0
0
,
and !FI2;t =

~RWt rr
H
t 0 0
0
; the full system can be written as
 
AFI11 0
AFI21 A
FI
22
! 
yFI1;t
yFI2;t
!
=
 
BFI11 0
BFI21 B
FI
22
! 
Ety
FI
1;t+1
Ety
FI
2;t+1
!
+
 
F FI11 0
0 0
! 
yFI1;t 1
yFI2;t 1
!
(26)
+
 
CFI11 0
0 CFI22
! 
!FI1;t
!FI2;t
!
;
in which the matrices are given in Appendix A.5.
Under the xed exchange rate regime, the complete separation between
world variables and relative variables disappears due to the reaction to nom-
inal exchange rate in the policy rules of the foreign country.
4.2 Determinacy
Under the xed regime, Rt , 
H
t , 
W
t , y
W
t , and y
H
t are the nonpredetermined
variables, while T^t 1 is the predetermined variable. If denote T^ lt = T^t 1, add
it to the system, and replace expectations by their true values, we can rewrite
the full equilibrium system (26) as 
LFI11 0
LFI21 L
FI
22
! 
Y FI1;t+1
Y FI2;t+1
!
=
 
MFI11 0
MFI21 M
FI
22
! 
Y FI1;t
Y FI2;t
!
+ otherFI ; (27)
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in which we dene Y FI1;t =

Rt T^t T^
l
t
0
and Y FI2;t =

Wt 
H
t y
W
t y
H
t
0
,
and the parameters matrices are given in Appendix A.5.
The matrices LFI21 and M
FI
21 are not null under the xed regime, due to
the reaction to the nominal exchange rate in the policy rule followed by
the foreign country, where the foreign policymaker concerns international
variables.
The reduced form of full system (27) is 
Y FI1;t+1
Y FI2;t+1
!
= JFI
 
Y FI1;t
Y FI2;t
!
+ otherFI ;
where the matrix JFI is lower block triangular. According to the results in
part 2.5.1, the discussion of condition for equilibrium determinacy for the full
system (27) is therefore equivalent to the discussion of determinacy condition
for the following two simplied subsystems
Y FI1;t+1 = J
FI
11 Y
FI
1;t + other
FI
1;t ; (27-1)
Y FI2;t+1 = J
FI
22 Y
FI
2;t + other
FI
2;t ; (27-2)
where JFI11 =
 
LFI11
 1
MFI11 ; J
FI
22 =
 
LFI22
 1
MFI22 : Since there are two nonpre-
determined variables and one predetermined variable in subsystem (27-1),
and there is no predetermined variable in subsystem (27-2), the determinacy
condition for full system (27) is that exactly two of three eigenvalues of JFI11
lie outside the unit circle, and all of four eigenvalues of JFI22 lie outside the
unit circle. This requirement implies the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Under a xed exchange regime dened by the rules of the
following form
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ;
{^Ft = {^
H
t   S^t;
with ,  and  non negative, if the degrees of rigidity are equal across
countries, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for equilibrium determinacy
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is
kC(  1) +  (1  ) > 0; (FI1)
 > 0: (FI2)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
The proposition show that once the nominal exchange rate is determined
by the condition of  > 0, the condition for determinacy is the same as in
the closed economy case with Taylor-type rules. Therefore, the determinacy
of the worldwide REE only depends on the choice of monetary policy for the
home country.
4.3 Learning stability
The full system (26) can be reduced to the following 
yFI1;t
yFI2;t
!
= P FI
 
Ety
FI
1;t+1
Ety
FI
2;t+1
!
+QFI
 
yFI1;t 1
yFI2;t 1
!
+KFI
 
!FI1;t
!FI2;t
!
; (28)
where
P FI =
  
AFI11
 1
BFI11 0
   AFI22  1AFI21  AFI11  1BFI11 +  AFI22  1BFI21  AFI22  1BFI22
!
;
QFI =
  
AFI11
 1
F FI11 0
   AFI22  1AFI21  AFI11  1 F FI11 0
!
;
KFI =
  
AFI11
 1
CFI11 0
   AFI22  1AFI21  AFI11  1CFI11  AFI22  1CFI22
!
:
Following section 2.5.2, the discussion of learnability for system (28) is
equivalent to the discussion of learnability for two simplied subsystems
yFI1;t = P
FI
11 Ety
FI
1;t+1 +Q
FI
11 y
FI
1;t 1 +K
FI
11 !
FI
1;t ; (28-1)
yFI2;t = P
FI
22 Ety
FI
2;t+1 +K
FI
22 !
FI
2;t ; (28-2)
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where
P FI11 =
 
AFI11
 1
BFI11 ; Q
FI
11 =
 
AFI11
 1
F FI11 ; K
FI
11 =
 
AFI11
 1
CFI11 ;
P FI22 =
 
AFI22
 1
BFI22 ; K
FI
22 =
 
AFI22
 1
CFI22 :
Supposing !FI1;t and !
FI
2;t follow vector AR(1) processes with serial correlation
given by the scalars '1 and '2, the MSV solutions for the two subsystems
are respectively in the form of
yFI1;t = a
FI
1 + b
FI
1 y
FI
1;t 1 + c
FI
1 !
FI
1;t ;
yFI2;t = a
FI
2 + c
FI
2 !
FI
2;t ;
Insert them into (28-1) and (28-2), and thus the REE is solved for the xed
regime as
n
aFI1 ; b
FI
1 ; c
FI
1
o
and

aFI2 ; c
FI
2
	
.23
The corresponding E-stability conditions are that all of the eigenvalues of
F FI11 

I11   P FI11 b
FI
1
 1
P FI11 , 

FI
11 

I11   P FI11 b
FI
1
 1
QFI11 , and P
FI
22 have
real parts less than one, which implies the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Under a xed exchange rate regime dened by the rules of
the following form
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ;
{^Ft = {^
H
t   S^t;
with ,  and  non negative, if the degrees of rigidity are equal across
countries, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for the MSV solution of
REE to be stable under adaptive learning is
kC(  1) +  (1  ) > 0;
 > 0:
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
23See Appendix II
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Given the calibration in Section 2.6, the gure 2 plots the conditions of
determinacy and learnability as a function of  and  , which is the same as
the lower line (FL2) under the oating regime.
The conditions for determinacy and learnability coincide again as under
oating regime. Once the nominal exchange rate is determinate, the con-
ditions of determinacy and learnability for the whole economy depend only
on the policy rules in the home country, which is equivalent to the closed
economy case. This result shows that the restriction for determinacy of equi-
librium under the xed regime is fairly broad and reasonable, and therefore
the xed regime are not necessarily destabilizing. Actually, under the xed
regime the central bank in the home country can inuence the aggregate
demand of both domestic and foreign households through the movements of
interest rate and nominal exchange rate. Therefore, the central bank in the
anchor country is just needed to be inward-looking to obtain the determinacy
and learnability for the world economy.
5 Managed exchange rate regimes
Under the managed regimes, it is assumed that the policy rule followed by one
country reacts to either the deviations of the level of the nominal exchange
rate or the changes in the nominal exchange rate, which implies a dirty
oatingexchange rate.
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5.1 Managed exchange rate regime I
5.1.1 The dynamic system
Under a managed exchange rate regime I, the policy rule followed by the
foreign country is assumed to react to the level of the nominal exchange rate,
while the home country just follows a simple Taylor-type feedback rule
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ; (10)
{^Ft = 
F
t +  y
F
t   1S^t;
Equations (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7), together with the interest rate rule
(10), characterize the log-linear equilibrium in the managed regime I.
If again denote Rt = 
F
t  Ht , and Wt = nHt +(1  n)Ft , following the
same procedures as above, the equilibrium conditions are8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
Rt =  kT

T^t   ~Tt

+ Et
R
t+1;
T^t = T^t 1 + S^t   S^t 1 + Rt ;
EtS^t+1 =  Rt +  
bTt   ~Tt+ (1 + 1) S^t;
Wt = kCy
W
t + Et
W
t+1;
yWt = Ety
W
t+1    1Wt    1 yWt +  1EtWt+1 +  1 (1  n)1S^t +  1 ~RWt :
If dene yMI1;t =

Rt T^t S^t
0
, yMI2;t =

Wt y
W
t
0
, !MI1;t =

~Tt 0 0
0
,
and !MI2;t =

~RWt 0
0
the full system can be written as
 
AMI11 0
AMI21 A
MI
22
! 
yMI1;t
yMI2;t
!
=
 
BMI11 0
0 BMI22
! 
Ety
MI
1;t+1
Ety
MI
2;t+1
!
+
 
FMI11 0
0 0
! 
yMI1;t 1
yMI2;t 1
!
(29)
+
 
CMI11 0
0 CMI22
! 
!MI1;t
!MI2;t
!
;
in which the matrices are given in Appendix A.5.
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Under the managed exchange rate regime I, the complete separation be-
tween world variables and relative variables again disappears due to the ad-
ditional reaction to the international variable, the nominal exchange rate, in
the policy rules of the foreign country.
5.1.2 Determinacy
Under this managed regime, Rt , S^t, 
W
t , y
W
t are the nonpredetermined vari-
ables, while T^t 1 and S^t 1 are the predetermined variables. If introduce the
notation T^ lt = T^t 1, S^
l
t = S^t 1, add them to the system, and then replace
expectations by their true values, we can rewrite the full equilibrium system
(29) as 
LMI11 0
LMI21 L
MI
22
! 
Y MI1;t+1
Y MI2;t+1
!
=
 
MMI11 0
MMI21 M
MI
22
! 
Y MI1;t
Y MI2;t
!
+ otherMI ;
(30)
in which we dene Y MI1;t =

Rt S^t T^
l
t S^
l
t
0
and Y MI2;t =

Wt y
W
t
0
,
and the matrices are given in Appendix A.5. The matrix LMI21 and M
MI
21 are
not null under the managed regime I, due to the reaction to the nominal
exchange rate in the policy rule followed by the foreign country, where the
foreign policymaker starts to concern international variables.
The reduced form of full system (30) is
Y MI1;t+1
Y MI2;t+1
= JMI
 
Y MI1;t
Y MI2;t
!
+ otherMI ;
where
JMI =
  
LMI11
 1
MMI11 0
   LMI22  1 LMI21  LMI11  1MMI11 +  LMI22  1MMI21  LMI22  1MMI22
!
and the matrix JMI is lower block triangular. As the discussion in section
2.5.1, to obtain the condition for equilibrium determinacy for the full system
(30) is therefore equivalent to calculating the determinacy condition for the
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following two simplied subsystems
Y MI1;t+1 = J
MI
11 Y
MI
1;t + other
MI
1;t ; (30-1)
Y MI2;t+1 = J
MI
22 Y
MI
2;t + other
MI
2;t ; (30-2)
where
JMI11 =
 
LMI11
 1
MMI11 ;
JMI22 =
 
LMI22
 1
MMI22 :
Since there are two nonpredetermined variables and two predetermined vari-
ables in subsystem (30-1), and there is no predetermined variable in subsys-
tem (30-2), the determinacy condition for full system (30) is that exactly two
of four eigenvalues of JMI11 lie outside the unit circle, and all of two eigenvalues
of JMI22 lie outside the unit circle. Notice that the subsystem (30-2) is in the
same form as under the oating regime (23-4), which implies the condition
(MI2). Therefore, following BB (2006), I get the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Under the managed exchange regime (I) with following in-
terest rate rules
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ;
{^Ft = 
F
t +  y
F
t   1S^t;
with ,  and 1 non negative as well as 1 non zero, if the degrees of
rigidity are equal across countries, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for
equilibrium determinacy is
1 > 0; (MI1)
kC(  1) +  (1  ) > 0: (MI2)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
It is easy to see that the Taylor principle is again su¢ cient for the deter-
minacy of REE under this managed regime. For any positive value of 1, the
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necessary and su¢ cient condition for determinacy is the same as its closed
economy counterpart. Compared with the oating regime case, the region
for determinate REE is therefore enlarged under this managed regime, due
to the additional reaction towards the nominal exchange rate in the policy
rule followed by the foreign country.24
5.1.3 Learning stability
The full system (29) can be reduced to the following 
yMI1;t
yMI2;t
!
= PMI
 
Ety
MI
1;t+1
Ety
MI
2;t+1
!
+QMI
 
yMI1;t 1
yMI2;t 1
!
+KMI
 
!MI1;t
!MI2;t
!
; (31)
where
PMI =
  
AMI11
 1
BMI11 0
   AMI22  1AMI21  AMI11  1BMI11  AMI22  1BMI22
!
;
QMI =
  
AMI11
 1
FMI11 0
   AMI22  1AMI21  AMI11  1 FMI11 0
!
;
KMI =
  
AMI11
 1
CMI11 0
   AMI22  1AMI21  AMI11  1CMI11  AMI22  1CMI22
!
:
It is in the same form as system (28) under the xed regime, and therefore
the discussion of learnability for system (31) is equivalent to the discussion
of learnability for two subsystems
yMI1;t = P
MI
11 Ety
FI
1;t+1 +Q
MI
11 y
FI
1;t 1 +K
MI
11 !
FI
1;t ; (31-1)
yMI2;t = P
MI
22 Ety
MI
2;t+1 +K
MI
22 !
MI
2;t ; (31-2)
24The condition happens to be the same as under the xed regime, since we assume the
identical parameters in the policy rules with  = , and  =  .
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where
PMI11 =
 
AMI11
 1
BMI11 ; Q
MI
11 =
 
AMI11
 1
FMI11 ; K
MI
11 =
 
AMI11
 1
CMI11 ;
PMI22 =
 
AMI22
 1
BMI22 ; K
MI
22 =
 
AMI22
 1
CMI22 :
Supposing !MI1;t and !
MI
2;t follow vector AR(1) processes as before, the MSV
solutions for the two subsystems are respectively in the form of
yMI1;t = a
MI
1 + b
MI
1 y
MI
1;t 1 + c
MI
1 !
MI
1;t ;
yMI2;t = a
MI
2 + c
MI
2 !
MI
2;t :
Insert them into (31-1) and (31-2), and then the REE is solved for the man-
aged regime I as
n
aMI1 ; b
MI
1 ; c
MI
1
o
and

aMI2 ; c
MI
2
	
:
The corresponding E-stability conditions are that all of the eigenvalues of
FMI11 

I11   PMI11 b
MI
1
 1
PMI11 , 

MI
11 

I11   PMI11 b
MI
1
 1
QMI11 , and P
MI
22
have real parts less than one. The subsystem (31-2) is again the same as
(23-2) under the oating regime, which implies that condition (MI2) is one
necessary condition for the learnability of REE in the whole economy. Fur-
thermore, the result of McCallum (2006) means that the condition (MI1),
and (MI2) for the equilibrium determinacy is su¢ cient for the learnability of
REE. Therefore, I obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Under a managed exchange rate regime I dened by the rules
of the following form
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ;
{^Ft = 
F
t +  y
F
t   1S^t;
with  and  non negative as well as 1 non zero, if the degrees of rigidity are
equal across countries, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for learnability
of REE is
1 > 0; (MI1)
kC(  1) +  (1  ) > 0: (MI2)
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Given the calibration in Section 2.6, the gure 3 plots the conditions of
determinacy and learnability as a function of  and  . Given any positive
value of 1, the lower line (MI2) is the condition for determinacy and learn-
ability of REE under this managed regime, which is the same condition as
(FL2) for the oating regime. The numerical results suggest that the con-
ditions for determinacy and learnability coincide again under this managed
regime.
In particular, the condition (MI2) is the necessary and su¢ cient condition
for determinacy and learnability of REE for the second subsystem of the
world average variables (30-2) and (31-2), while additional condition (FL1)
is required for the determinate and learnable REE of the rst subsystem
for relative variables (30-1) and (31-1) when 1 = 0. It implies that an
additional reaction to the level of nominal exchange rate in the policy rule
of the foreign country will generally enlarge the region for determinacy and
learnability of REE and therefore improve the trade-o¤ between parameters
 and  for the central banks, compared with the oating regime. The
enlarged region is the part of northeast of line (MI2), which implies the same
condition for determinacy and learnability of REE in the closed economy
case. Therefore, even though the conditions for determinacy and learnability
could become more stringent due to the open economy considerations of
the central bank, the restriction for policymakers is not necessarily stricter
than the closed economy case when there is additional reaction towards the
nominal exchange rate in the policy rules. The enlarged region is due to the
terms of trade e¤ects over the output gap. To see this more explicitly, we
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recall the equation (22), which is derived from the denition of the output
gap and aggregate demand functions (2)
y^Ht   y^Ft = T^t   ~Tt:
Substitute the terms of trade denition equation (4) into it, we can get
y^Ht   y^Ft = T^t 1 + S^t   S^t 1 + Ft   Ht   ~Tt;
which implies
S^t =
 
y^Ht + 
H
t
   y^Ft + Ft   T^t 1 + S^t 1 + ~Tt:
Therefore, the policy rule followed by the foreign country becomes
{^Ft = 
F
t +  y
F
t + 1
 
y^Ft + 
F
t
  1  y^Ht + Ht   T^t 1 + S^t 1 + ~Tt :
This is a more aggressive rule than the Taylor-type rule with the same para-
meters  and  for the foreign country, due to an additional reaction towards
domestic ination rate and output gap by size of 1. Equivalently, it implies
the condition for determinacy and learnability of the foreign country is less
stringent. Intuitively, it is because the home central bank not only inuence
the domestic demand of households but also the foreign demand through the
movements of the terms of trade. The condition for determinacy and learn-
ability of the home country and therefore the world economy is less stringent,
which implies explicit or implicit monetary interdependence across countries.
Finally, Taylor Principle is again su¢ cient for determinacy and learnability
under this managed regime. In particular, given  = 0, it is easy to see that
 > 1 is the necessary and su¢ cient condition to guarantee the determinacy
and learnability of REE.
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5.2 Managed exchange rate regime II
5.2.1 The dynamic system
Under a managed exchange rate regime II, the rule followed by the foreign
country is assumed to react to the changes of the level of the nominal ex-
change rate from a dened target
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ; (11)
{^Ft = 
F
t +  y
F
t   24St:
Equations (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7), together with the interest rate rule
(11), characterize the log-linear equilibrium under the managed exchange
rate regime II.
Following the same procedures as above, the equilibrium conditions are8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
Rt =  kT

T^t   ~Tt

+ Et
R
t+1;
T^t = T^t 1 +4St + Rt ;
Et4St+1 =  Rt +  

T^t   ~Tt

+ 24St;
Wt = kCy
W
t + Et
W
t+1;
yWt = Ety
W
t+1    1Wt    1 yWt +  1EtWt+1;
+ 1 ~RWt + 
 1 (1  n)24St:
If dene yMII1;t =

Rt T^t 4St
0
, yMII2;t =

Wt y
W
t
0
,and !MII1;t =
~Tt 0 0
0
, and !MII2;t =

~RWt 0
0
, the full system can be written as a
matrix form 
AMII11 0
AMII21 A
MII
22
! 
yMII1;t
yMII2;t
!
=
 
BMII11 0
0 BMII22
! 
Ety
MII
1;t+1
Ety
MII
2;t+1
!
+
 
FMII11 0
0 0
! 
yMII1;t 1
yMII2;t 1
!
+
 
CMII11 0
0 CMII22
! 
!MII1;t
!MII2;t
!
; (32)
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in which the matrices are given in Appendix A.5.
Because of the additional reaction to the change of nominal exchange rate
in the policy rules of foreign country, the complete separation between world
variables and relative variables disappears under this managed regime II.
5.2.2 Determinacy
Under this managed regime, Rt , 4St, Wt , yWt are the nonpredetermined
variables, while T^t 1 is the predetermined variables. Introduce the notation
T^ lt = T^t 1 and add it to the system, and then replace expectations by their
true values. If dene Y MII1;t =

Rt 4St T^ lt
0
and Y MII2;t =

Wt y
W
t
0
,
the full system (32) can be written as the following matrix form 
LMII11 0
0 LMII22
! 
Y MII1;t+1
Y MII2;t+1
!
=
 
MMII11 0
MMII21 M
MII
22
! 
Y MII1;t
Y MII2;t
!
+ otherMII ;
(33)
in which the matrices are given in Appendix A.5. Now the matrix MMII21 is
not null, which is due to the reaction to change of the nominal exchange rate
in the policy rule followed by the foreign country.
The reduced form of full system (33) is
Y MII1;t+1
Y MII2;t+1
= JMII
 
Y MII1;t
Y MII2;t
!
+ otherMII ;
where
JMII =
  
LMII11
 1
MMII11 0 
LMII22
 1
MMII21
 
LMII22
 1
MMII22
!
and the matrix JMII is lower block triangular. As the discussion above, to
obtain the condition for equilibrium determinacy for the full system (33) is
therefore equivalent to calculating the determinacy condition for the following
two simplied subsystems
Y MII1;t+1 = J
MII
11 Y
MII
1;t + other
MII
1;t ; (33-1)
Y MII2;t+1 = J
MII
22 Y
MII
2;t + other
MII
2;t ; (33-2)
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where
JMII11 =
 
LMII11
 1
MMII11 ;
JMII22 =
 
LMII22
 1
MMII22 :
Since there are two nonpredetermined variables and one predetermined vari-
able in subsystem (33-1), one determinacy condition is that exactly two of
three eigenvalues of JMII11 lie outside the unit circle. The subsystem (33-2) is
again in the same form as under the oating regime. Following BB (2006b),
I obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Under the managed exchange regime (II) with ,  , and
2 non negative, if the degrees of rigidity are equal across countries, the
necessary and su¢ cient condition for equilibrium determinacy is
kT (+ 2   1) +  (1  ) > 0; (MII1)
kC(  1) +  (1  ) > 0; (MII2)
Therefore, under managed regime II, additional reaction towards the
change of nominal exchange rate does have explicit e¤ects on the conditions
for determinacy and learnability, in which the region is generally enlarged
given a positive parameter 2.
Furthermore, recall the discussion of determinacy for the system (DE2)
in Section (2.5). It is suggested that in order to obtain the determinacy for
whole economy, not only the full system (15) need to satisfy the condition for
determinacy, but also two independent subsystems (15-1) and (15-2) have to
satisfy the determinate conditions. For example, when  = 0:7, and  = 0:1,
with 2 = 0:3, the eigenvalues of J
 1
11 for the rst subsystem for relative
variables are f4:02362; 0:993687; 0:825368; 0:g, while the eigenvalues of J 122
for the second subsystem for world average variables are f1:0491; 0:545589_g.
In this calibrated case, the full system satises the condition for determinacy,
since there are exactly four eigenvalues of J lying inside unit circle. However,
the whole economy is not determinate, because the two subsystems do not
satisfy the conditions for determinacy independently.
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5.2.3 Learning stability
The full system (32) can be reduced as following 
yMII1;t
yMII2;t
!
= PMII
 
Ety
MII
1;t+1
Ety
MII
2;t+1
!
+QMII
 
yMII1;t 1
yMII2;t 1
!
+KMII
 
!MII1;t
!MII2;t
!
;
(34)
where
PMII =
  
AMII11
 1
BMII11 0
   AMII22  1AMII21  AMII11  1BMII11  AMII22  1BMII22
!
;
QMII =
  
AMII11
 1
FMII11 0
   AMII22  1AMII21  AMII11  1 FMII11 0
!
;
KMII =
  
AMII11
 1
CMII11 0
   AMII22  1AMII21  AMII11  1CMII11  AMII22  1CMII22
!
:
PMII12 , Q
MII
12 , and K
MII
12 are null, and therefore the discussion of learn-
ability for system (34) is again equivalent to the discussion of learnability for
two simplied subsystems
yMII1;t = P
MII
11 Ety
FII
1;t+1 +Q
MII
11 y
FII
1;t 1 +K
MII
11 !
FII
1;t ; (34-1)
yMII2;t = P
MII
22 Ety
MII
2;t+1 +K
MII
22 !
MII
2;t ; (34-2)
where
PMII11 =
 
AMII11
 1
BMII11 ; Q
MII
11 =
 
AMII11
 1
FMII11 ; K
MII
11 =
 
AMII11
 1
CMII11 ;
PMII22 =
 
AMII22
 1
BMII22 ; K
MII
22 =
 
AMII22
 1
CMII22 :
Supposing !MI1;t and !
MI
2;t follow vector AR(1) processes as before, the MSV
solutions for the two subsystems are respectively in the form of
yMII1;t = a
MII
1 + b
MII
1 y
MII
1;t 1 + c
MII
1 !
MII
1;t ;
yMII2;t = a
MII
2 + c
MII
2 !
MII
2;t :
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Insert them into (34-1) and (34-2), the REE is solved for the managed regime
II as
n
aMII1 ; b
MII
1 ; c
MII
1
o
and

aMII2 ; c
MII
2
	
:
The corresponding E-stability conditions are that all of the eigenvalues of
FMII11 

I11   PMII11 b
MII
1
 1
PMII11 , 

MII
11 

I11   PMII11 b
MII
1
 1
QMII11 , and
PMII22 have real parts less than one. The subsystem (34-2) is again the same
as (23-2) under the oating regime, which implies one necessary condition
for learnability of REE in the whole economy is (MII2). Following the result
in McCallum (2006), I get the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Under a managed exchange regime II dened by the rules of
the following form
{^Ht = 
H
t +  y
H
t ;
{^Ft = 
F
t +  y
F
t   24St;
with ,  , and 2 non negative, if the degrees of rigidity are equal across
countries, the necessary and su¢ cient condition for learnability of REE is
kT (+ 2   1) +  (1  ) > 0; (MII1)
kC(  1) +  (1  ) > 0: (MII2)
Given the calibration in Section 2.6, the gure 4 plots the conditions
of determinacy and learnability as a function of  and  . The middle line
and the lower line are respectively the two conditions of determinacy and
learnability (MII1) and (MII2), while the upper line describes the condition
(FL1) under the oating regime.
Given a positive value for 2, the line (FL1) moves parallel to the south-
west. When 2 = 0:3 in this calibrated case, the line (FL1) moves to the line
(MII1). As we discussed before, the condition (MII1) describes the condition
for the determinacy and learnability of relative variables in the subsystem
(34-1), and the condition (MII2) describes the condition for the determinacy
and learnability of world variables in the subsystem (34-2). Therefore, the
region for determinate and learnable interest rate rules is the intersection of
northwestern parts of both line (MII1) and (MII2). The condition for de-
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terminacy and learnability still coincide under this managed regime. Appar-
ently, the region for monetary policy to obtain determinacy and learnability
of REE is enlarged under managed regime II than under oating regime,
due to the positive parameter of 2. When 2 is larger, the region is larger,
and is at most the northeast part of line (MII2). Therefore, the additional
reaction towards the changes of the nominal exchange rate in the policy rule
followed by the foreign country will also enlarge the region for determinacy
and learnability of REE as under the managed regime I. Recall again the
equation (22) and the terms of trade denition equation (4), which imply
4St =
 
y^Ht + 
H
t
   y^Ft + Ft   T^t 1 + ~Tt:
The policy rule followed by foreign country then becomes
{^Ft = 
F
t +  y
F
t + 2
 
y^Ft + 
F
t
  2  y^Ht + Ht   T^t 1 + ~Tt :
The policy rules for the foreign country is more aggressive due to the addi-
tional reaction towards domestic ination rate and output gap by value of 2,
and thus the condition for  and  is less stringent. The enlarged region is
also due to the terms of trade e¤ects. Furthermore, Taylor Principle,  > 1,
is still su¢ cient for determinacy and learnability of REE.
5.3 More on numerical analysis
Above discussion assumes identical parameters before the ination rate and
output gap in policy rules followed by both countries. In this section, we
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relax this assumption and instead assume that the home country and for-
eign country follow interest rate rules with di¤erent parameters before the
ination rate while there is no reaction towards output gap for simplicity.
Under the managed regime I, the policy rules become
biHt = Ht ; (10-1)biFt = Ft   1 bSt:
If dene yMI;t =

yWt ; 
H
t ; 
F
t ; S^t; T^t
0
, and !MI;t =

~RWt ;
~Tt; ~Tt; 0; 0
0
, the
dynamic system becomes
AMIy

FL;t = B

MIEty

MI;t+1 + F

MIy

MI;t 1 + C

MI!

MI;t;
in which the matrices are given in Appendix A.5.
Varying the parameters ,  and 1, I check the determinacy and learn-
ability of REE for di¤erent pairs of policy rules followed by both countries,
which is (Table-MI).
Table-MI
1 = 0:000001 1 = 0:1
  Det ES
1:2 1:2 Y es Y es
1:2 0:9 No Y es
1:2 0:6 No No
0:9 1:2 No No
0:9 0:9 No No
  Det ES
1:2 1:2 Y es Y es
1:2 0:9 Y es Y es
1:2 0:6 Y es Y es
0:9 1:2 No No
0:9 0:9 No No
The determinacy and learnability conditions coincide again from the numer-
ical result. Proposition 5 and 6 imply that the Taylor Principle is su¢ cient
for the determinacy and learnability of REE under managed regime I; and
in particular, given  = 0,  =  > 1 is the necessary and su¢ cient con-
dition when parameters before ination rate in policy rules are assumed to
be identical. The numerical results in (Table-MI) support the Taylors intu-
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ition. However, it also show that the necessary and su¢ cient condition for
determinacy and learnability is only closely linked to the Taylors Principle
for the home country, while the condition for the foreign country could be
quite generous for a not very small reaction towards the nominal exchange
rate in foreign policy rule. The larger reaction towards the nominal exchange
rate by 1, the larger region for policy rules followed by the foreign country.
Therefore, the policy rules followed by the two countries are not required
to be simultaneously aggressive any more. For example, when 1 = 0:1,
 = 0:1 can still guarantee the determinacy and learnability for the whole
economy.
Under the managed regime II, the policy rules become
biHt = Ht ; (11-1)biFt = Ft   24St:
If dene yMII;t =

yWt ; 
H
t ; 
F
t ;4St; T^t
0
, and !MII;t =

~RWt ;
~Tt; ~Tt; 0; 0
0
,
the dynamic system becomes
AMIIy

FL;t = B

MIIEty

MII;t+1 + F

MIIy

MII;t 1 + C

MII!

MII;t;
in which the matrices are given in Appendix A.5.
Varying ,  and 2, check the determinacy and learnability for di¤erent
pairs of policy rules followed by the two countries, which imply (Table-MII).
Table-MII
2 = 0:3; n = 0:4 2 = 0:7; n = 0:4 2 = 0:3; n = 0:6
  Det ES
1:2 1:2 Y es Y es
1:2 0:9 No No
0:9 1:2 No No
0:9 0:9 No No
  Det ES
1:2 1:2 Y es Y es
1:2 0:9 Y es Y es
0:9 1:2 No No
0:9 0:9 No No
  Det ES
1:2 1:2 Y es Y es
1:2 0:9 Y es Y es
0:9 1:2 No No
0:9 0:9 No No
Again, the Taylor Principle is su¢ cient for the determinacy and learn-
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ability of the REE. However, the above numerical results again show that the
necessary and su¢ cient condition for determinacy and learnability is closely
linked to the Taylors Principle only for the home country, while the policy
rule followed by the foreign country can be less aggressive due to additional
reaction toward the change of nominal exchange rate, for example, when
2 = 0:7; n = 0:4. The enlarged region for the policy rules followed by the
foreign country depends on the value of parameter 2, and the larger of 2
the more enlarged region. Furthermore, the economic size also has e¤ects
on the condition for determinacy and learnability of REE. For example, the
larger of the home country size n, the less aggressive policy rule is required
for the foreign country. Intuitively, the larger economic size of the home
country implies the larger monetary inuence imported by the foreign coun-
try through the terms of trade e¤ects from the home country, and thus the
less stringent condition is required for the policy rule followed by the foreign
country.
6 Conclusion
This paper discussed determinacy and learnability for monetary policy within
a New Keynesian two-country model, based on Benigno and Benigno (2006b).
It was found that the open economy consideration by the central bank di-
minishes the region for determinate and learnable interest rate rules relative
to the closed economy counterpart under the oating regime. However, the
region is enlarged under other exchange rate regimes, due to the additional
reaction towards the change or level of the nominal exchange rate in the
policy rules. The terms of trade channel and therefore the monetary inter-
dependence among countries is crucial for the dynamics of the economy in
the open economy case, even without the explicit coordination of the policy-
makers.
The study of learning stability in open economies has provided new in-
sights for the design of monetary policy rules, and there is much further work
to be undertaken in the future research. This paper has only discussed the
learnability for simple interest rate instrument rules. However, the design
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of monetary policies in an open economy framework is quite controversial
compared with in a closed economy case, since there are more variables to-
ward which monetary policy can react. For example, Ball (1998) suggests a
long-run ination targeting rule and a monetary conditions index" rule as
the policy instruments in an open economy.25 Zanna (2004) introduces the
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) rules, which is a real exchange rate targeting
rule, in emerging economies. Besides, Ghironi (1998), McCallum and Nelson
(1998), Monacelli (1998), Svensson (2000) and Weeparana (1998), and others
have also analyzed monetary policies in an open-economy framework. Future
research should focus on other forms of monetary policies.
Secondly, the baseline model has some strict assumptions. By relaxing
some of the assumptions or incorporating more complex models, there will
be more interesting ndings for the learning problems in an open economy
environment. For example, Benigno and Benigno (2006a) introduce an alter-
native two-country model, which permits variation of the substitutability of
goods across countries. It will potentially allow more analysis on shock trans-
mission, monetary interdependence and their implication for policy design.
Furthermore, recently there are a large body of literature to discuss the tar-
geting rules. In particular, some recent literature, such as Svensson (2002)
and Benigno and Benigno (2006a), has derived ination targeting rules in
open economy environments. A vital topic that requires further research is
to analyse whether or not optimal ination targeting can lead to determinate
and learnable REE, especially in open economy settings.
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Appendix A
A.1. Determinacy
Proof of Proposition 1. Under a oating exchange rate regime, in order to
get the determinate equilibrium for the full system (23), the two subsystems
(23-3) and (23-4) should satisfy the condition for determinacy separately.
The determinacy condition for subsystem (23-3) is that exactly two of three
eigenvalues of matrix J11FL lie outside the unit circle, and the determinacy
condition for subsystem (28-4) is that all of the two eigenvalues of matrix
J22FL lie outside the unit circle. The three eigenvalues of J
11
FL are 0 and8<: r1 
1+kT++  
p
(1+kT++ )
2 4(1+kT+ )
2
;
r2  1+kT++ +
p
(1+kT++ )
2 4(1+kT+ )
2
:
The determinacy for subsystem (23-3) therefore requires jr1j > 1 and jr2j > 1.
Since r2 > r1 > 0, it is equivalent to prove r1 > 1, which requires
1 + kT +  +   
q
(1 + kT +  +  )
2   4 (1 + kT+  )
2
> 1
=) 1 + kT    +  >
q
(1 + kT +  +  )
2   4 (1 + kT+  )
=) (1 + kT +    )2   (1 + kT +  + )2 + 4 (1 + kT+  ) > 0
=) [kT (  1) +  (1  )]  > 0
=) kT (  1) +  (1  ) > 0:
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The two eigenvalues of J22FL are:8<: r3 
kC+++  
p
 4(+kC+ )+(kC+++ )2
2
;
r4  kC+++ +
p
 4(+kC+ )+(kC+++ )2
2
:
The determinacy for subsystem (28-4) therefore requires jr3j > 1 and jr4j > 1.
Since r4 > r3 > 0, it is equivalent to prove r3 > 1, which requires
kC + + +   
q
 4 (+ kC+  ) + (kC + + +  )2
2
> 1
=) kC +   +  >
q
 4 (+ kC+  ) + (kC + + +  )2
=) (kC +   +  )2   (kC + + +  )2 + 4 (+ kC+  ) > 0
=) kC (  1) +  (1  ) > 0:
Proof of Proposition 3. Under the xed exchange rate regime, the
subsystem (27-1) can be written as
Y FI1;t =
 
JFI11
 1
Y FI1;t+1 + other
FI
1;t ;
where  
JFI11
 1
=
 
MFI11
 1
LFI11 =
0B@  0  kT0 0 1
  0 kT + 1
1CA :
Because this subsystem has two predetermined variables, the condition for
determinacy is that exactly two of three eigenvalues of JFI11 in subsystem
(27-1) lie outside the unit circle, which is equivalent to that exactly two
eigenvalues of
 
JFI11
 1
lie inside the unit circle and one outside. The three
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eigenvalues of
 
JFI11
 1
are 0 and8<:
1+kT+ 
p
 4kT +(1+kT )2
2
;
1+kT++
p
 4kT +(1+kT )2
2
:
Then the determinacy for subsystem (27-1) requires1 + kT +   
q
4kT + (1 + kT   )2
2
 < 1;1 + kT +  +
q
4kT + (1 + kT   )2
2
 > 1:
They are always satised for any positive values of  and kT . The proofs are
as follows.
From
1+kT+ p4kT +(1+kT )22  < 1;
=)  1 + kT +  <
q
4kT + (1 + kT   )2
=) (1  kT   )2   4kT   (1 + kT   )2 < 0
=)  4kT < 0:
From
1+kT++p4kT +(1+kT )22  > 1;
=)
q
4kT + (1 + kT   )2 > 1  kT   
=) 4kT + (1 + kT   )2   (1  kT   )2 > 0
=) 4kT > 0:
For the subsystem (27-2), because there is no predetermined variable, the
condition for determinacy is that exactly all eigenvalues of JFI22 lie outside
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the unit circle. The eigenvalues of JFI22 are 1,
1

, and8<:
kC+++  
p
 4(+kC+ )+(kC+++ )2
2
;
kC+++ +
p
 4(+kC+ )+(kC+++ )2
2
:
Then the determinacy requireskC+++  p 4(+kC+ )+(kC+++ )22  > 1;kC+++ +p 4(+kC+ )+(kC+++ )22  > 1;
which implies the other condition for determinacy
kC (  1) +  (1  ) > 0:
The derivation is the same as that in Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 5. See the Technical Appendix of BB (2006a).
To see the Proof of Proposition 5 more clearly, we assume  =  = 0,
and then the eigenvalues of JMI11 are 1 + , 0, and8<:
1+kT+ 
p
(1+kT+)
2 4
2
;
1+kT++
p
(1+kT+)
2 4
2
:
The eigenvalue 1+kT+ 
p
(1+kT+)
2 4
2
is always inside the unit circle, since
0 <
1 + kT +   
q
(1 + kT + )
2   4
2
< 1
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) 1 + kT +   
q
(1 + kT + )
2   4 < 2
) 1 + kT    <
q
(1 + kT + )
2   4
) (1 + kT   )2   (1 + kT + )2 + 4 < 0
)  4 (1 + kT ) + 4 < 0
)  4kT < 0;
which always holds. The other eigenvalue 1+kT++
p
(1+kT+)
2 4
2
is always
outside the unit circle, since
1 + kT +  +
q
(1 + kT + )
2   4
2
> 1
) 1 + kT +  +
q
(1 + kT + )
2   4 > 2
) 1 + kT    +
q
(1 + kT + )
2   4 > 0;
which always holds for  < 1. Actually, there are always two eigenvalues of
JMI11 inside the unit circle, while the other two are always outside the unit
circle, for any positive 1.
A.2. REE
Solution 9 (REE under a oating regime) In the subsystem (23-1)
yFL1;t = P
FL
11 Ety
FL
1;t+1 +Q
FL
11 y
FL
1;t 1 +K
FL
11 !
FL
1;t ;
the solutions for b
FL
1 is determined by equation
P FL11
 
bFL1
2   bFL1 +QFL11 = 0:
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There are three possible solutions for bFL1 .
26 Take the only stationary one for
bFL1 with all the eigenvalues of b
FI
1 inside the unit circle. Therefore, under a
oating regime, the REE for subsystem (23-1) is solved as8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
aFL1 = 0;
b
FL
1 =
0B@ 0 0 00 0 0
0  1 0
1CA ;
cFL1 =
0BB@
(1 '1)kT
( '1)kT+(1 '1)(1 '1)+ (1 '1)
( '1)kT+ (1 '1)
( '1)kT+(1 '1)(1 '1)+ (1 '1)
( 1)kT+ (1 '1)
( '1)kT+(1 '1)(1 '1)+ (1 '1)
1CCA ;
;
and the REE for subsystem (23-2) is solved as8>><>>:
aFL2 = 0;
cFL2 =
 
  kC
kC( ) ( 1+)(( 1+)  )
1 
kC( +)+( 1+)(( 1+)  )
!
:
Solution 10 (REEs under a xed regime) In subsystem (28-1)
yFI1;t = P
FI
11 Ety
FI
1;t+1 +Q
FI
11 y
FI
1;t 1 +K
FI
11 !
FI
1;t ; (28-2)
the solutions for b
FI
1 are determined by equation
P FI11
 
bFI1
2   bFI1 +QFI11 = 0:
26The nonstationary solutions are quite complex, and thus I do not show here.
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There are two possible solutions for bFI1
bFI1;1 =
0@ 0 1+kT  p4kT +(1+kT )22
0
1+kT+ 
p
4kT +(1+kT )2
2
1A ;
bFI1;2 =
0@ 0  1+kT++p4kT +(1+kT )22
0
1+kT++
p
4kT +(1+kT )2
2
1A :
Take the only stationary one bFI1;1 with all its eigenvalues inside the unit circle.
Therefore, under a xed regime, the REE for subsystem (28-1) is
aFI1 = 0;
b
FI
1 =
0@ 0 1+kT  p4kT +(1+kT )22
0
1+kT+ 
p
4kT +(1+kT )2
2
1A ;
cFI1 =
0@ 2kT1+kT++p4kT +(1+kT )2 2'1 0
2kT
1+kT++
p
4kT +(1+kT )2 2'1
0
1A :
The REE for subsystem (28-2) is
aFI2 = 0;
cFI1 =
0BBBB@
kC(( 1+'2)  )
Z
kC 
Z
0 0
kC(( 1+'2)  )
Z
kC 
Z
0 0
 ( 1+'2)(( 1+'2)  )
Z
  '2 
Z
0 0
kC( '2+)
Z
 ( 1+'2)( 1+'2)+kC('2 )
Z
0 0
1CCCCA ;
where denote
Z  ( 1 + '2) ( ( 1 + '2) ( 1 + '2) + kC (  '2) +    '2 ) :
A.3. Learnability
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Proof of Proposition 2. Under a oating exchange rate regime, the
eigenvalues of

I11   P FL11 b
FL
1
 1
QFI11 in subsystem (23-1) are all zeroes, and
the eigenvalues of

I11   P FL11 b
FL
1
 1
P FL11 in subsystem (23-1) are 0 and8<:
1+kT++  
p
(1+kT++ )
2 4(1+kT+ )
2(1+kT+ )
;
1+kT++ +
p
(1+kT++ )
2 4(1+kT+ )
2(1+kT+ )
;
which means one of the E-stability conditions is
kT (  1) +  (1  ) > 0:
For the subsystem (23-2), the corresponding eigenvalues of P FL22 are8<:
kC+++  
p
 4(+kC+ )+(kC+++ )2
2(+kC+ )
;
kC+++ +
p
 4(+kC+ )+(kC+++ )2
2(+kC+ )
;
which means a second condition for E-stability is
kC (  1) +  (1  ) > 0:
The derivation is the same as that in Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Under a xed exchange rate regime, the eigen-
values of

I11   P FI11 b
FI
1
 1
P FI11 and

I11   P FI11 b
FI
1
 1
QFI11 in the subsystem
(28-1) are8<: 0;1+kT++p(1+kT )2 4kT
2(1+kT )
2 ;
and
8<: 0;1+kT++p(1+kT )2 4kT
2(1+kT )
2 :
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For the subsystem (28-2), the eigenvalues of P FI22 are 1,  and8<:
kC+++  
p
 4(+kC+ )+(kC+++ )2
2(+kC+ )
;
kC+++ +
p
 4(+kC+ )+(kC+++ )2
2(+kC+ )
;
which means the E-stability condition is
kC (  1) +  (1  ) > 0:
The derivation is the same as that in Proof of Proposition 1.
A.4. Interdependence across the countries under learn-
ing
Suppose ~Tt and ~RWt follow AR(1) processes of the following forms
~Tt = '1 ~Tt 1 + 
1
t ;
~RWt = '2
~RWt 1 + 
2
t ;
where 0 < '1; '2 < 1, with 
1
t and 
2
t are iid stochastic processes. The
dynamic system under the oating regime is in the following form
yFL;t = P

FLEty

FL;t+1 +Q

FLy

FL;t 1 +K

FL!

FL;t: (23*)
The MSV solutions for system (23*) can be written as
yFL;t = a

FL + b

FLy

FL;t 1 + c

FL!

FL;t;
which is the perceived law of motion of representative agents. Assuming the
time-t information set
 
1; y
0
FL;t; !
0
FL;t

, substitute the PLM into (23*). It
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follows that the MSV solution of system (23*) satises
(I   P FLbFL   P FL)aFL = 0;
P FL (b

FL)
2   bFL +QFL = 0; (24*)
(I   P FLbFL)cFL   P FLcFL'1  KFL = 0:
From (24*), the REE is solved for the oating regime as
n
aFL; b

FL; c

FL
o
:
The corresponding E-stability conditions are that all the eigenvalues of
DTa, DTb, and DTc have real parts less than 1, where
DTa =

I   P FLb

FL
 1
P FL;
DTb =

I   P FLb

FL
 1
QFL
0



I   P FLb

FL
 1
P FL

;
DTc =

I   P FLb

FL
 1
P FL'1;
which means that all the eigenvalues of
I   P FLb

FL
 1
P FL and

I   P FLb

FL
 1
QFL
have the real parts less than 1.
A.5. Parameter Matrices
1. Section 3.4:
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The matrices are
AFL =
0BBBBBB@
1 n

(1 n)

0 0
 kC 1 0 0   (1  n) kT
 kC 0 1 0 nkT
0    0 0
0 1  1  1 1
1CCCCCCA ;
BFL =
0BBBBBB@
1 n

1 n

0 0
0  0 0 0
0 0  0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCCCA ;
F FL =
0BBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCA ; C

FL =
0BBBBBB@
 1
  (1  n) kT
nkT
0
0
1CCCCCCA :
2. Section 3.4 (DE)
The matrix J is
J =
0BBBBBB@
1 + kC

n( 1)

( 1)(1 n)

0 0
 kC

1+kT kTn

kT (n 1)

kT (n 1)

kT (n 1)

 kC

 kTn

1+kTn

kTn

kTn

0    0 0
0  1 1 1 1
1CCCCCCA :
3. Section 4.1 (26)
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The matrices are
AFI11 =
 
1  1
1 kT
!
; AFI21 =
0BBBB@
0 0
0   (1  n) kT
0 0
0   (1  n)
1CCCCA ;
AFI22 =
0BBBB@
1 0  kC 0
0 1  kC 0
0  1 1  1 
0  1 0 1 +  1 
1CCCCA ; BFI11 =
 
0 0
 0
!
;
BFI21 =
0BBBB@
0 0
0 0
0 0
0   (1  n)
1CCCCA ; BFI22 =
0BBBB@
 0 0 0
0  0 0
 1 0 1 0
 1 0 0 1
1CCCCA ;
F FI11 =
 
0  1
0 0
!
; CFI11 =
 
0 0
kT 0
!
;
CFI22 =
0BBBB@
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
1CCCCA :
4. Section 4.2 (27)
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The matrices are
LFI11 =
0B@ 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1
1CA ; LFI21 =
0BBBB@
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0   (1  n) 0
1CCCCA ;
LFI22 =
0BBBB@
 0 0 0
0  0 0
 1 0 1 0
 1 0 0 1
1CCCCA ;MFI11 =
0B@ 1  1 11 kT 0
0 1 0
1CA ;
MFI21 =
0BBBB@
0 0 0
0   (1  n) kT 0
0 0 0
0   (1  n) 0
1CCCCA ;MFI22 =
0BBBB@
0  kC 0
1  kC 0
 1 1  1 
 1 0 1 +  1 
1CCCCA :
5. Section 5.1.1 (29)
The matrices are
AMI11 =
0B@ 1 kT 0 1 1  1
   1 + 1
1CA ; AMI21 =
 
0 0 0
0 0   1 (1  n)1
!
;
AMI22 =
 
1  kC
 1 1 +  1 
!
; BMI11 =
0B@  0 00 0 0
0 0 1
1CA ;
BMI22 =
 
 0
 1 1
!
; FMI11 =
0B@ 0 0 00 1  1
0 0 0
1CA ;
CMI11 =
0B@ kT 0 00 0 0
 0 0
1CA ; CMI22 =
 
0 0
 1 0
!
:
6. Section 5.1.2 (30)
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The matrices are
LMI11 =
0BBBB@
 0  kT 0
0 0  1 0
0 1   0
0 0 0 1
1CCCCA ; LMI21 =
0B@ 0 0 0 10 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1CA ;
LMI22 =
 
 0
 1 1
!
;MMI11 =
0BBBB@
1 0 0 0
 1  1  1 1
  1 + 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
1CCCCA ;
MMI21 =
 
0 0 0 0
0  1 (1  n)1 0 0
!
;MMI22 =
 
1  kC
 1 1 +  1 
!
:
7. Section 5.2.1 (32)
The matrices are
AMII11 =
0B@ 1 kT 0 1 1  1
   2
1CA ; AMII21 =
 
0 0 0
0 0   1 (1  n)2
!
;
AMII22 =
 
1  kC
 1 1 +  1 
!
; BMII11 =
0B@  0 00 0 0
0 0 1
1CA ;
BMII22 =
 
 0
 1 1
!
; FMII11 =
0B@ 0 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
1CA ;
CMII11 =
0B@ kT 0 00 0 0
 0 0
1CA ; CMII22 =
 
0 0
 1 0
!
:
8. Section 5.2.2 (33)
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The matrices are
LMII11 =
0B@  0  kT0 0  1
0 1   
1CA ; LMII22 =
 
 0
 1 1
!
;
MMII11 =
0B@ 1 0 0 1  1  1
   0
1CA ;MMII21 =
 
0 0 0
0   1 (1  n) 0
!
;
MMII22 =
 
1  kC
 1 1 +  1 
!
:
9. Section 5.3
The matrices are
AMI =
0BBBBBB@
1 n

(1 n)

  (1 n)1

0
 kC 1 0 0   (1  n) kT
 kC 0 1 0 nkT
0    1 + 1 0
0 1  1  1 1
1CCCCCCA ;
BMI =
0BBBBBB@
1 n

1 n

0 0
0  0 0 0
0 0  0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCCCA ;
F MI =
0BBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0  1 1
1CCCCCCA ; C

MI =
0BBBBBB@
 1
  (1  n) kT
nkT
0
0
1CCCCCCA :
10. Section 5.3
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The matrices are
AMII =
0BBBBBB@
1 n

(1 n)

  (1 n)2

0
 kC 1 0 0   (1  n) kT
 kC 0 1 0 nkT
0    2 0
0 1  1  1 1
1CCCCCCA ;
BMII =
0BBBBBB@
1 n

1 n

0 0
0  0 0 0
0 0  0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0
1CCCCCCA ;
F MII =
0BBBBBB@
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCA ; C

MII =
0BBBBBB@
 1
  (1  n) kT
nkT
0
0
1CCCCCCA :
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